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Creating a New Kind of Intellectual
Property: Applying the Lessons of the
Chip Law to Computer Programs
Pamela Samuelson*
INTRODUCTION
Whether semiconductor chip designs' should be protected
by amending existing copyright law or by creating a completely
new form of legal protection is a controversy that understanda-
bly does not excite the popular imagination. Congress has re-
solved the issue in favor of a new, or sui generis,2 scheme.3
* © Pamela Samuelson 1985; Associate Professor, University of Pitts-
burgh School of Law.
1. Semiconductor chips, often referred to simply as "chips" or "inte-
grated circuits," are thin slices of semiconductive material (usually silicon) in
which layers of electronic switches connected by thin wires have been laid.
Each switch is functionally a transistor. Nowadays it is common for chips to
contain several thousand switches. Chips are commonly manufactured by lay-
ing a stencil, often referred to as a "mask," on top of a layer of semiconductive
material, and then etching or imprinting the circuitry pattern on the layer
through one of a number of different processes. See inkfra note 16.
Chips perform two different kinds of functions in modern computers.
Some are memory units which store information (data or program instruc-
tions), either permanently (known as "read only memory" or "ROM" chips be-
cause the computer can only "read" the stored information, it cannot change
or "write" new information into such a memory device) or temporarily
(known as "random access memory" or "RAM" chips, capable of receiving and
temporarily storing data, and allowing changes to be made in what is stored in
the cell). Other kinds of chips serve as the central processing units of com-
puters, that is, as hardware components that are responsible for execution of
computer program instructions. See H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-
13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5750, 5760-62 [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT] (All citations to the House Report are to the star
print. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News contains
the initial version of the House Report. The star print corrected typographical
errors in the initial version and contains three additional pages.); Boraiko, The
Chip, 162 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 421, 421 (1982); Toong & Gupta, Personal Com-
puters, Sci. AM., Dec. 1982, at 87-94.
2. Sui generis is defined as: "Of its own kind of class; i.e., the only one of
its own kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979) (empha-
sis in original).
3. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit.
III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984)).
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That resolution will not and should not stop scholars from
pondering the wisdom of Congress's decision, particularly
when, in the future, developers of other new technologies take
their cases for sui generis protection to Washington.
The creation of a sui generis form of intellectual property
law was a somewhat radical approach for Congress to take. In
the past, Congress had virtually always incorporated new sub-
ject matters into either the patent or copyright laws rather
than creating a new form of legal protection.4 The last time-
4. The copyright statute has successively been amended to incorporate
photographs, motion pictures, phonograph records, and in 1980, computer pro-
grams in machine-readable form. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) and 17 U.S.C.A. § 117
(West Supp. 1985)); NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 14-15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
CONTU FINAL REPORT]. Similarly, two quasi-sui generis schemes have previ-
ously been added to the patent statute: in 1870, protection for nonobvious or-
namental designs for articles of manufacture was added, see Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, §§ 71-76, 16 Stat. 198, 209-10 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 171-173 (1982)) (shorter period of protection for design than for utility pat-
ent but design not required to meet utility standard), and in 1930, protection
for novel and distinct varieties of asexually reproduced plants was added, see
Act of May 23, 1930, Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1982)) (providing for different set of exclusive rights, re-
quirement of distinctiveness, and less rigorous specification requirement). See
generally 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 1.04-.05 (1985). Additionally, the patent
statute has been broadly interpreted to include subject matters that Congress
could not have envisioned, such as genetically engineered products. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (live, human-made microorga-
nism held to be patentable subject matter).
New kinds of intellectual property rights have also been created at com-
mon law, perhaps most notably, the right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that "human can-
nonball" performer had right to control broadcast of his act); see also Interna-
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (holding that a news
organization had a quasi-property right in the news it gathered).
Another new kind of intellectual property right, created by Congress in
1984, concerned unauthorized reception and retransmission of cable television
signals by persons with satellite dishes. See Cable Communication Policy Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 6(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.
2779, 2804) 4655 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1962 & Supp. 1985)). The
copyright law was insufficient to deal with this problem for two reasons: re-
ception and display of signals in a private home would not violate any of the
exclusive rights of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); and cable companies
could not sue for "theft" of their signals under the copyright laws unless they
were themselves the copyright owners, see 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982), which was
unusual. The law as enacted makes lawful the reception of unencrypted cable
signals by individual households in areas where there is no cable marketing
system established even though retransmission of signals (as to units in an
apartment building) is unlawful. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1962 & Supp
1985); see also R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 422-23 (4th ed.
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now nearly a century ago--that Congress tried to create a new
category of federal intellectual property law, the Supreme
Court struck it down.6 It would have been very difficult, how-
ever, for Congress to try to expand the copyright laws to pro-
tect semiconductor chip designs. One of the central tenets of
copyright law is that a copyright will not protect "utilitarian
works," that is, works that have a usefulness beyond merely
the conveying of information or the display of an appearance. 7
Since chips are clearly "utilitarian works,"" to include them
under copyright law would have required abandoning one of its
fundamental tenets. Congress had never consciously decided to
give a utilitarian subject matter copyright protection; on many
1985). One might also characterize the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2321-2582 (1982), as a kind of intellectual property law.
5. See Piracy Ban Nears For Silicon Chips, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, at
1, col. 4 (chip law would be first new federal intellectual property law in more
than a century).
6. See Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). The Supreme Court
struck down a federal trademark statute that Congress had passed in 1870,
holding that trademarks had always been protected by state law and that Con-
gress had to have specific authority in the Constitution to preempt state law in
this area. Id. The current federal trademark statute was primarily aimed at
giving federal recognition to what are essentially state-created trademark
rights. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETrTIvE PRocEss 281-85 (2d ed.
1979). Congress was therefore concerned in 1984 about its power to enact a sui
generis scheme for semiconductor designs. See Copyright Protection for Semi-
conductor Chips: Hearings on H.R. 1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1983) (Representative Kastenmeier question-
ing the Copyright Office spokesperson about the constitutionality of protecting
chip designs) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Hearings]. Congress concluded,
however, that it could do so under its commerce clause powers, if not under
the patent/copyright clause. See S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1984) [hereinafter cited'as SENATE REPORT].
7. This principle has been incorporated into the copyright statute at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article") and 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1982)
(copyright in drawing does not extend to manufacture of article drawn). The
principle has long been recognized in copyright law. In Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879), the most famous application of this principle, the Supreme
Court held that copyright protection for a book that explained a particular ac-
counting system did not extend to the use of the system itself. See Oxman,
Intellectual Property Protection and Integrated Circuit Masks, 20 JUluMERucs
J. 405, 44446 (1980) (citing Baker v. Selden as still good law); see also Samuel-
son, CONTU Revisited- The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 727-49 (discussing
utilitarian character of machine-readable computer programs); infra notes 59-
67 and accompanying text.
8. For a description of the utilitarian function of computer chips, see
supra note 1.
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occasions, in fact, Congress had consciously decided not to do
so.
9
This changed in 1980,10 however, when Congress extended
copyright protection to computer programs in machine-reada-
ble' form.' 2 The report of the National Commission on New
9. Congress has repeatedly rejected bills to create copyright protection
for designs of utilitarian works. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, DRAFT, SECOND
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ch. VII (1975) (reporting that between
1914 and 1957 nearly 50 such bills were introduced in Congress).
10. See infra notes 186-191 and accompanying text regarding the utility of
computer programs in machine-readable form; see also Samuelson, supra note
7, at 672-68, 741-49 (arguing that since all machine-readable computer pro-
grams have utility beyond just information conveyance and image display, they
should not be copyrightable).
11. "Machine-readable" means the program is written in machine lan-
guage; this generally represents the final stage in the development of a pro-
gram. As noted in an earlier article:
There are often several phases in the development of an operable
computer program. Each phase may be characterized by a different
written work. The writings may include: a description of the task or
tasks the program is intended to perform; a formulation-in either
mathematical or nonmathematical terms--of the algorithm of the
program, that is, the programmer's idea about how the task should be
accomplished; a flow chart that schematically depicts the steps the
programmer thinks will be necessary to carry out the algorithm; and
the source code, which is a written statement of the precise set of in-
structions that when transformed into "machine language" will be ca-
pable of producing the desired result in the desired manner....
The transformation of source code to machine code is accom-
plished within the computer by processing the source code through an
operating system known as a "compiler." In the transformation pro-
cess, compiler programs often restructure the set of program instruc-
tions so that the hardware will be able to execute them.
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 685-86.
Machine code is simply ones and zeros that are translated into electrical
pulses that direct the computer to perform specific functions; it is not readable
by human beings. "In seeking to preserve a competitive advantage and protect
proprietary rights in computer software, many software companies distribute
only machine-readable object code copies of their software." Grogan, Decom-
pilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software Protection, 1 COMPUTER LAW.,
Feb. 1984, at 1. The source code is generally not provided, which means that a
user cannot read the actual program instructions on the screen. Thus, it is
generally the machine-readable version of the program that software pirates
appropriate.
12. The law extending copyright protection to machine-readable programs
was § 10 of the Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(copyright amendments codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) and 17 U.S.C.A. § 117
(West Supp. 1985)). The copyright amendments can be found in the House
bill's subsection IV, which dealt with miscellaneous items. The amendments
were relatively minor, involving only the addition of a definition of "computer
program" to § 101, the deletion of the interim § 117, and the substitution of a
new § 117 that gave owners of copyrighted programs a limited right to make
[Vol. 70:471
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Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), 13 on
which Congress relied in enacting that amendment, however,
was seriously flawed.14 Congress was not advised of the utilita-
rian character of programs or warned of the serious changes
that would result if a utilitarian subject matter was taken into
the copyright fold.'5
This Article argues that Congress should reconsider its de-
cision to protect machine-readable computer programs through
copyright law. The decision to use copyright was based on a
faulty conception of copyright. Congress rejected that concep-
tion of copyright when it enacted the sui generis chip protec-
modifications in them and to make archival copies. See H.R. 6933, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 29890 (1980).
Although there is considerable legislative history concerning the patent
and trademark issues of this Act, very little legislative history focused on the
copyright issues. The House Report on the bill mentions that the bill embod-
ies the CONTU recommendations, but does not discuss the copyrightability is-
sues. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482; see also Keplinger, Computer Software-
Its Nature and Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 502 (1981) (quoting from House
Report as to sparseness of legislative history).
13. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. The ninety-third Congress had
authorized establishment of this Commission as a part of the Act of Dec. 31,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74. Congress gave the Com-
mission three years to study and report on a variety of new technology issues.
The Commission began its work in October 1975 and issued its final report on
July 31, 1978. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-8. The report
recommended amending the copyright law to include machine-readable com-
puter programs as copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 12-13.
14. In another article this author has criticized CONTU for the serious
flaws in its analysis relating to, among other things, the utilitarian character of
programs. See Samuelson, supra note 7. Of necessity, some points of that arti-
cle's analysis will be repeated here. The aim of this article, however, is to par-
ticularize why sui generis legislation for machine-readable programs is
desirable notwithstanding the fact that copyright is already in place for other
types of computer programs and that there will be some resistance to adoption
of a sui generis approach for software.
15. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 727-49. The courts that thus far have
upheld the copyrightability of computer programs in machine-readable form
have not been willing to look beyond Congress's enactment of the CONTU
recommendations. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding utility problems with copy-
right for operating systems), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (3d Cir. 1983) (rely-
ing on Congressional action), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see also The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1201 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-33 (1983) (statement of Dorothy Schrader,
Associate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs, Copyright Office) (discuss-
ing the utilitarian work cases) [Ms. Schrader's statement will be cited herein-
after as Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings and the Committee's
hearing will be cited as 1983 Senate Hearings].
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tion legislation. The Article first traces the congressional
debate concerning chip protection, specifically whether a copy-
right or sui generis approach would best accomplish the goal of
protecting semiconductor chip design. The Article then consid-
ers the larger implications of that debate, with a particular fo-
cus on the social bargains implicit in the systems of patent and
copyright law, and a consideration of the ramifications of incor-
porating a nonutilitarian subject matter into the copyright
framework. The Article then discusses a possible alternative
conception of copyright law, one that would protect utilitarian
subject matter. This conception seemed to underlie the argu-
ments in favor of extending copyright protection to both
machine-readable programs and semiconductor chips. Congress
ultimately rejected this alternative conception of copyright law
during the chip debate. If properly informed about the utilita-
rian character of machine-readable programs, Congress would
likely have rejected this conception with regards to machine-
readable programs also. Finally, the Article examines the need
for sui generis protection for machine-readable computer pro-
grams, and concludes that the same reasons Congress had for
adopting a sui generis approach to protection of chip designs
support adopting a sui generis approach to protection of
machine-readable computer -programs.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE OVER CHIP
PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT OR SUI GENERIS?
The semiconductor industry sought legal protection for
chip designs for several years before the goal was finally
achieved. In the late 1970's, an attempt was made to persuade
the Register of Copyrights to recognize chip masks16 or the
16. Semiconductor chip products are most frequently manufactured
by a process known as "photolithography" or "masking." After the
two and three dimensional features of shape and configuration of a
chip have been determined, the layout (or "topography") of the chip
can be fixed in pictorial form-a so-called "composite" drawing of the
various layers of the chip, shown in different colors on a very large
sheet of paper. The same information can be recorded in digital form,
by storing all the relevant coordinates of points in the composite
drawing in a computer tape known as a "data base tape."
This information is then used to generate a series of "masks,"
which are stencils used to manufacture chips. Chips are manufac-
tured by etching material (or otherwise removing it) away from semi-
conductor wafers and depositing material (or otherwise placing it) on
the wafers. The etching and depositing processes configure the chips
to the patterns comprising the mask work protected by this Act. The
masks are used to control the etching and depositing processes.
[Vol. 70:471
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chips themselves as copyrightable subject matter.17 The Regis-
ter was willing to accept technical drawings of chip design lay-
outs for copyright registration,' 8  but refused to accept
registration of the chips themselves, or of the masks used to
make them, on the ground that the chips and the masks were
utilitarian works ineligible for copyright protection. 19 At least
one semiconductor chip firm filed suit to compel the Register to
accept their products for copyright registration,20 but the litiga-
tion avenue did not look promising and the lawsuit was with-
drawn without prejudice.2 1
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHIP PROTECTION BILLS
In 1979, the semiconductor chip firms took their case to
Congress. The House of Representatives held a hearing on a
bill that would have amended the copyright law to include chip
masks and products. 22 The bill would have, in one sentence,
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-13, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5761-62.
17. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 30
n.10.
18. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5757.
19. As the House Report states, "the fundamental principle codified in 17
U.S.C. 113 has meant that any protection as a 'technical drawing' does not pro-
tect the copyright owner of the drawing with respect to unauthorized duplica-
tion of the finished useful article represented by the drawing." Id.; see also
Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 29-30 (discussing
the historic refusal of the copyright office to register copyrights in design or
"topology" of semiconductor chips); inrfra notes 92-93, and accompanying text.
20. See Intel Corp. v. Ringer, No. 77-2848 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 1978).
21. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 n.20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5757 n.20 (indicating that the Intel case was withdrawn by plain-
tiff without prejudice). At least one commentator has argued for the
copyrightability of chip designs under existing copyright law. See Comment,
Copyright for Integrated Circuit Designs: Will the 1976 Act Protect Against
Chip Pirates?, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 817, 845-50 (1983). Had Intel continued with the
suit, however, the courts would probably have deferred to the Register's judg-
ment not to permit registration. See Norris Indus. v. I.T.&T. Corp., 696 F.2d
918, 922 (11th Cir.) (deference accorded to Copyright Office decisions concern-
ing registrability), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). Furthermore, the statute
itself seems to bar the plaintiff's claims. "No court has held that duplication of
a semiconductor chip violates any rights in the registered technical drawing.
Under 17 U.S.C. 113, no other conclusion seems likely." HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 8, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5757 (footnote omitted).
22. See Copyright Protection for Imprinted Design Patterns on Semicon-
ductor Chips, 1979: Hearings on H.R. 1007 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hear-
ings]. Apparently, CONTU had been consulted about whether, or to what ex-
1985]
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exempted semiconductor masks from the utilitarian objection
that had been standing in the way of copyright protection.3
The Copyright Office, however, raised a number of serious
questions about protecting chip designs under the copyright
scheme.24 Additionally, two of the four representatives of semi-
conductor industry firms who testified concerning the bill op-
posed it for a variety of reasons, including the utilitarian
character of the subject matter and the potential for excessive
and counterproductive protection.25 The 1979 House bill was
not even reported out of Committee. 26
tent, copyright protection should be given to the design of computer chips.
The issue, however, came up too late in CONTU's deliberations for it to make
a recommendation. Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15,
at 34.
23. The House bill would have added one sentence to the definition of
"[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in § 101 of the Copyright Act to in-
dicate that this class of works would "also include the photographic masks
used to imprint patterns on integrated circuit chips and include the imprinted
patterns themselves even though they are used in connection with the manu-
facture of, or incorporated in a useful article." H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). In other words, this additional sentence would have made mask works,
and even chips, copyrightable works.
24. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 34;
1979 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 14-15. The Copyright Office's questions
about the 1979 bill included: whether the layouts of chip designs were dictated
by the nature of the chip functions or whether they represented merely a cre-
ative choice from a host of possibilities; what the relationship would be be-
tween the chip masks and products, on the one hand, and the programs stored
in them, or used to generate them, on the other; and whether copyright pro-
tection for masks should be subject to the same or different terms of protec-
tion, scope of rights, and remedies as other copyrighted works. See 1979 House
Hearings, supra note 22, at 14-15.
25. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 51-62; see also Schrader
Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 35-36. Dorothy Schrader
stated:
Opponents of H.R. 1007 argued that protection would reduce the
ability of U.S. firms to compete in the world market and would in-
crease costs to U.S. consumers. They argued that chips, as utilitarian
articles, cannot appropriately be protected by copyright; existing copy-
right protection for computer programs and patent protection for cer-
tain processes was adequate; industry practices of "second sourcing"
or "reverse engineering" would be inhibited if not illegal; existing
copyright remedies (especially the remedy allowing destruction of in-
fringing articles) would work an undue hardship; protection was be-
ing sought for ideas; and copyright gives more protection than is
necessary to encourage innovation in this field.
Id (footnotes omitted).
26. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 36.
During the ninety-seventh Congress, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. and
Representative Don Edwards introduced bills (S. 3117, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S15,488-89 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1982) and H.R. 7207, 97th Cong., 2d
[Vol. 70:471
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Chip piracy,27 of course, remained a subject of intense con-
cern to the semiconductor industry.28 In 1983 both the House
and the Senate introduced bills to extend a modified form of
copyright protection to semiconductor chip designs.2 The
semiconductor industry, no longer as concerned as they were
earlier about whether the law included all or only some of the
features of copyright, supported these bills.30 Although there
were some differences between these bills,31 they were similar
in that they treated chips in a significantly different manner
than other copyrighted works. For example, these bills re-
duced the term of protection to ten years32 and provided a dif-
Sess. (1982) respectively) to grant copyright protection to mask works, but
nothing came of these bills either. Id
27. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., High Tech: Leaving Home, Battling to Innovate and Emulate:
Intel v. Nippon Electric, Wash. Post, May 2, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
29. The first two chip design bills introduced in the 98th Congress were
H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H643-44 (daily ed. Feb. 24,
1983) and S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S5992-93 (daily ed. May
4, 1983).
30. See, e.g., 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 47 (testimony of F.
Thomas Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.) (indicating
preference for modified copyright protection, but not opposing sui generis).
The Semiconductor Industry Association supported both the copyright and sui
generis bills to protect semiconductor designs. See, e.g., Bills Offer Protection
For Chips, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1984, at D1, col. 6.
As a practical matter, in order to get useful legislation enacted it was
probably necessary for the industry to compromise and accept a system with
different features than the "full dress" copyright system. The Copyright Of-
fice in 1983 still opposed the concept of making chip design protection an inte-
gral part of copyright law. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings,
supra note 15, at 51. The Association of American Publishers also opposed a
copyright approach, see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 11 (testimony of
Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel, Association of American Publishers), as
did Professor L. Ray Patterson, see id at 56-57 (statement and testimony of L.
Ray Patterson, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law), and
others.
31. For example, the Senate bill, unlike the House bill, contained a provi-
sion giving chip designers the exclusive right to use a copyrighted chip design
and contained no reverse engineering provision. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed. May 4, 1983); see also infra notes
113-120 and accompanying text.
32. Although both bills introduced in 1983 took a copyright approach to
chip design protection, both would have shortened the duration of protection
to ten years. See H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 129 CONG. REC. H644
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983); S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 129 CONG. REC. S5993
(daily ed. May 4, 1983). In contrast, traditional copyright owners are protected
for a significantly longer time: individual owners are entitled to protection for
their life plus 50 years; and corporate owners are protected for the shorter of
75 years from the date of publication or 100 years from the date of creation. 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
1985]
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ferent set of exclusive rights to chip designers than copyright
law provided to copyright owners. 33
In 1984, both the House and the Senate substituted new
bills3 for the 1983 versions. The bill the Senate reported out of
Committee was described as a "copyright" bill and, like its
predecessor, it proposed amendment of various internal provi-
sions of existing copyright law to extend protection to chip
masks, but at the same time, it treated mask works differently
from other copyrighted works.-3 The bill the House reported
out of committee was described as a "sui generis" bill and, for
the first time, proposed a statute that was free standing but
modeled partly on existing copyright law.-9 The law eventually
enacted was even more of a sui generis law than this sui
generis House bill.3 7
33. See infra notes 113-123 and accompanying text for a comparison of the
sets of exclusive rights.
34. The Senate bill retained its number, but its scope was altered. Senate
bill 1201, as reported out of the Judiciary Committee in 1984, explicitly al-
lowed reverse engineering of chip designs and eliminated the original bill's
compulsory license provision. Compare S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG.
REC. S5837-38 (daily ed. May 16, 1984) (S. 1201 as reported out of committee in
1984) with S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983) (the original S. 1201). The House dropped H.R. 1028 and substi-
tuted a new bill. See H.R. 5525, p8th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91
(daily ed. June 11, 1984); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 39-41 (com-
paring H.R. 1028 and H.R. 5525).
35. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed.
May 16, 1984). The revised Senate bill would have amended six existing provi-
sions of the copyright statute and would have added two new provisions to the
statute. Among the amendatory provisions were: (1) the addition of three
terms, "semiconductor chip product," "mask," and "chip mask," to the § 101
copyright definition provisions, (2) a modification of the § 102 provision on the
subject matter of copyright, to include "mask works," (3) the creation of a set
of exclusive rights applicable only to mask works within the exclusive rights
provision of § 106, (4) the addition of a new subsection limiting the duration of
protection of mask works to ten years, and (5) slight changes to two of the
remedy provisions. The new provisions included: a provision creating a right
to make copies of the chip design for reverse engineering purposes, and a pro-
vision protecting an "innocent purchaser of an infringing semiconductor chip
product" from full liability. Id at 35. Although the Senate called this a "copy-
right" bill, it was really a quasi-sui generis approach, not just a few easily inte-
grated special provisions for chips. See infra notes 113-116 and accompanying
text.
36. See H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984).
37. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984) (the current law) with
H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed. June 11,
1984) (the sui generis House bill). The law as enacted, for instance, does not
refer to chip design owners as "authors," define mask works in terms of intrin-
sic utilitarian character, or define the term "original."
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From the two congressional committee reports on the chip
design bills, it is possible to get the impression that the primary
difference between the Senate and House bills was a decision
whether to call the law copyright or sui generis.38 Although
this seems to be a minor matter, this controversy was a mani-
festation of a larger controversy concerning the essence of
copyright.39 The underlying question was whether protection
of chip designs could, in fact, be successfully integrated into the
copyright law. The Senate Committee concluded that integra-
tion was possible, and the House Committee concluded that it
was not.
B. THE SENATE COMMITTEE'S ARGUMENTS FOR
A COPYRIGHT APPROACH
The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the chip de-
sign legislation pronounced that "the copyright system is not
only adequate, but well suited to the task at hand. On balance,
[the Committee] concludes that protection can best be provided
within the framework of existing copyright law, rather than
through the creation of a new and untried form of sui generis
protection."40 The Senate Report cited six reasons for this
conclusion.
First, over the centuries copyright had been expanded
many times to include new forms of expression.41 Although
recognizing that the extension of copyright to chip designs
would be a step beyond traditional boundaries, the Committee
did not think it would be "a giant leap."42 The Committee dis-
missed the argument that copyright protection should not be
extended to utilitarian subject matter because "copyright today
protects a vast range of works, some of which have value al-
most exclusively as utilitarian objects. '43  The Committee
38. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5754-60; SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-15.
39. See infra notes 131-161 and accompanying text.
40. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Committee on the Judiciary noted that such utilitarian things
as "belt bucklets [sic], telephone books, ashtrays, eyeshades, door knockers,
pill boxes, and advertisements" had all been accepted as copyrightable, so they
found no reason to not protect chip designs. Id. at 12-13 (quoting 1983 Senate
Hearings, supra note 15 (statement of Arthur Miller, Professor of Law,
Harvard University) (statement was inadvertently left out of printed hearing
record, it is in subcommittee files)); see also 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note
15, at 89 (testimony of Arthur Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University)
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found support for its conclusion in two Supreme Court deci-
sions. In Mazer v. Stein,44 the Court had "noted that the indus-
trial use of an article is no bar to its protection under copyright
law,'" 45 and in Goldstein v. California,46 the Court had broadly
interpreted the constitutional term "writings" 47 to include
" 'any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
aesthetic labor.' ",48 Clearly, chip masks and products are physi-
cal renderings of intellectual labor,49 and thus seemed to be
[hereinafter cited as Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings]. As discussed
infra note 182 and accompanying text, Miller's interpretation reflects a serious
misunderstanding of the meaning of "utilitarian" in copyright doctrine.
44. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
45. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. This interpretation of Mazer that
the Senate relied on confuses somewhat the relationship between copyright
and industrial uses. The Senate misunderstood the Court's reasoning in Ma-
zer. The issue in Mazer was whether a copyrighted statuette that was subse-
quently incorporated into a lamp base should be deprived of copyright
protection because the plaintiff had always intended to use it as a lamp base.
The Court did not say that any industrial product could be copyrighted, but
rather that a properly copyrighted sculpture did not necessarily lose its protec-
tion because of its subsequent incorporation into an industrial article. See Ma-
zer, 347 U.S. at 218 ("We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for
copyright bars or invalidates its registration."). Thus the Court in Mazer was
not ruling that any useful article could be copyrighted.
46. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
47. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
48. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (quoting Goldstein, 412 U.S. at
561). This statement, however, may be dicta. The issue in Goldstein was
whether sound recordings could be "writings" within the meaning of the Con-
stitution. Given that sound recordings are simply a different medium for pre-
serving music, words, and the like, and that the contents of the recording can
be communicated with the aid of a machine, sound recordings may be suffi-
ciently like other forms of copyright subject matter to be considered "writ-
ings." That does not necessarily mean the Court would hold any human-made
thing to be a "writing." See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 732-36.
49. One of the issues that received only glancing attention in the legisla-
tive history of the semiconductor chip law was the role of computer programs
in the design of chip circuit patterns. The House Hearings include as Appen-
dix 3 an article by Michael Feuer which discusses the very substantial role
that automation, "fueled" by computer programs, now plays in the process of
designing very large scale integrated (VLSI) chips. See 1983 House Hearings,
supra note 6, at 380-86 (setting out Michael Feuer, VLSI Design Automation:
An Introduction, 71 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 5 (1983)). A few speakers did
raise questions about how automation should affect the rights given to those
who develop designs in this manner. See, e.g., 1983 House Hearings, supra
note 6, at 78 (testimony of Dorothy Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights
for Legal Affairs, Copyright Office) ("There is some uncertainty also about the
scope of protection for designs developed with the assistance of a computer
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within the constitutional sweep of the copyright laws.
The Senate's second argument in favor of copyright fo-
cused on the considerable similarity in form and function be-
tween mask works and such copyrightable works as maps and
technical drawings.' The Senate Committee relied on these
similarities to support its conclusion that copyright doctrine
would be only minimally distorted by protecting chip designs.51
Third, the Senate Committee predicted that protecting
chips through copyright would "encourage certainty and stabil-
ity within the field of semiconductor chip design. '5 2 Because
the bounds of copyright had been explored extensively in the
past, a chip protection law under the copyright scheme would
give more guidance to members of the industry-be they inno-
vators, reverse engineers, or copyists-than would a sui generis
scheme. A chip protection statute containing new concepts
and terms might "invite costly litigation to define the parame-
ters of the new form of protection.
53
The fourth reason for preferring copyright was the uncer-
tainty of obtaining international protection for chip designs if
Congress adopted a sui generis scheme.5 Although acknowl-
edging that the differences between mask works and traditional
copyright subject matters would create some uncertainty about
international recognition of a United States copyright for chip
designs, the Senate Committee viewed a sui generis scheme as
creating even more uncertainty.
5 5
A fifth reason was the "simplicity and economy" of a copy-
right approach.- Since any sui generis form of protection for
chip designs would have to borrow heavily from copyright con-
cepts, it seemed easier to simply incorporate chip designs
within copyright and make the few adjustments necessary to
make the integkation work.
Finally, the Senate Committee addressed the fears of some
commentators that adopting a more limited form of copyright
program."). The issue, however, was never squarely faced. Both copyright and
patent law have assumed humans to be the only entities capable of any crea-
tivity and originality. It seems that no one wants to face the possibility that
we may no longer be so. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra
note 43, at 88; see also infra notes 245, 258-264 and accompanying text.






56. Id- at 14.
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for mask works would distort copyright, setting a dangerous
precedent that might one day be used to erode the rights of
other copyright owners. This fear had led some parties to pre-
fer a sui generis form of protection.57 The Committee thought
its bill made it sufficiently clear that there would be no such
erosion.8
C. THE HOUSE COMMITTEE'S ARGUMENTS FOR
' A SUI GENERIS APPROACH
The major argument in favor of sui generis protection for
chip designs, as reflected in the House Report, was actually an
anti-copyright argument. Mask works and chip products were
not subject matters that historically had been regarded as copy-
rightable, and the House Committee believed there were sound
reasons for refusing to extend copyright protection to include
them.59 The Register of Copyrights had refused to register
mask works and chip products because they were "utilitarian"
in a copyright sense; that is, they had a function beyond merely
portraying an appearance or conveying information.6° Utilita-
rian works are not copyrightable. 61  The House Report
explained:
The prohibition against copyright in useful articles is a funda-
mental principle of our copyright laws, adhered to for the nearly 200
years of their existence. In philosophical terms, the prohibition rests
on the distinction between protection for expression and nonprotec-
tion for ideas under copyright, and on the differences in scope, stan-
dards, term, and purpose of the patent and copyright systems. In
pragmatic terms, the nonprotection of useful articles that do not meet
the patent standards of novelty and invention represents a societal
judgment that the public benefits from relatively unhampered imita-
tive copying of non-novel useful articles .... 62
Although copyright sometimes had been extended to artistic
57. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 109 (testimony of Jon
Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel, Association of American Publishers).
58. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
59. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5757-58.
60. See id at 6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5755. See generally
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 727-49 (distinguishing utilitarian works from copy-
rightable portrayals and expressions).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article"); see also supra
notes 7, 9. Similarly, utilitarian elements of works with both utilitarian and
nonutilitarian features are not copyrightable. See infra note 63 and accompa-
nying text.




features of utilitarian works, such features were only protected
by copyright when they could be identified separately from and
were capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects
of the work.63 In the case of chips and chip masks, this "sepa-
rate-identification-and-independent-existence" test could not be
met. That is, a copyright for a chip product or chip mask would
have to be a copyright on its functional features.
The House Committee recognized that mask works were in
some respects similar to maps, technical drawings, photographs,
and audiovisual works, all clearly copyrightable. 64 The Com-
mittee described these similarities as "superficial," however,
and found mask works to be "in fact very dissimilar in function
and nature of creativity" from these other items.65 Mask works
were to be protected because of
the technical and creative skill employed in laying out or designing
electronic circuitry. Mask works have no intrinsic aesthetic purpose.
Even if the layouts convey information, that is not their sole or main
purpose: their primary purpose is to be used in the manufacture of a
useful article-semiconductor chip products.66
The House Committee regarded the rule against copyright
protection for utilitarian works to be so fundamental that a sui
generis approach was required to protect chip designs. The
House Committee predicted that there would be "formidable
philosophical, constitutional, legal and technical problems asso-
ciated with any attempt to place protection for mask works or
semiconductor chip designs under the copyright law . ,,*"67
These formidable problems could be avoided by creating a sui
generis form of protection, in some ways similar to copyright
but ultimately freestanding. This new law would pertain only
to semiconductor chip designs.
Responding to the Senate Committee's argument that
63. Id at 9, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5758. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982) (definition of "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" incorpo-
rates this test); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) discussed supra
note 45.




67. Id- For a discussion of these obstacles, see iftfra note 92 and accompa-
nying text. What the House Committee did not specifically say was that it pre-
ferred this sui generis approach because it would avoid conflict with the many
copyright cases holding that copyrights on drawings did not extend to the use
of the drawings to create useful articles. See supra notes 7, 15 and accompany-
ing text; see also Samuelson, supra note 7, at 731 n.312 (citing cases that re-
fused copyright protection to useful works depicted in copyrighted drawings).
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greater certainty would result from a copyright approach be-
cause of the ability to draw on nearly two hundred years of
copyright precedents, the House Committee asserted that it was
not necessary to call the law "copyright" to be able to draw on
pertinent copyright precedents. The House Committee stated
that the new law "could draw by analogy on this statutory and
case law framework to the extent clearly applicable to mask
works and semiconductor chip protection, but should not be re-
stricted by the limitations of existing copyright law."
Moreover, in the House Committee's view, the interna-
tional aspects of a law intended to protect chip designs also
weighed against the copyright approach. There were, to begin
with, some substantial problems with fitting a copyright mask
work protection scheme under the Universal Copyright Con-
vention. 69 No country besides the United States had considered
protecting mask works under the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, and there was no assurance that any would do so.7° Be-
cause of the "national treatment" provisions of the Universal
Copyright Convention, a United States decision to protect mask
works under copyright would require the United States to pro-
tect mask works by nationals of foreign countries, even though
those foreign countries would have no reciprocal obligation to
protect mask works by United States nationals.7 1 A sui generis
approach, on the other hand, would allow the United States to
only grant protection to foreign chip designs of those countries
that granted equivalent protection to United States companies.
Thus, the House Committee thought that a sui generis ap-
proach was a better solution to the international protection
problem.72
II. REFLECTIONS ON THE COPYRIGHT/SUI
GENERIS DEBATE
The previous section summarizes the copyright versus sui
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5759-60.
69. Id at 7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5756.
70. Id.
71. Id at 7-8, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5756-57.
72. See id. at 8, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5757. A sui generis
approach was consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Id The Committee also noted that while the international dimen-
sions were not insignificant, it regarded the establishment of a meaningful sys-
tem of domestic protection as its paramount concern. Id at 7, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5756.
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generis "debate" as it was reflected in those portions of the
Senate and House reports that were specifically devoted to dis-
cussion of that issue. Those portions actually depict only some
of the many considerations that went into the decision-making
process. A review of the committee reports as a whole and of
the congressional hearings reveals a more complete set of rea-
sons for the choice of a sui generis approach rather than a
copyright approach. It is clear that Congress was somewhat
slow in coming to the conclusion that sui generis protection for
chip designs was preferable to copyright, partly because it was
slow to realize the negative implications of protecting chip de-
signs under copyright. Congress was also slow to appreciate the
positive benefits that would flow from a freestanding statute
specially molded to the unique characteristics of semiconductor
chips.
A. COPYRIGHT AS THE LEAST INAPPROPRIATE
OF EXISTING OPTIONS
The utilitarian objection to copyright protection of chip de-
signs was apparent from the first time the proposal surfaced.
73
What lingered as an appealing feature of copyright law was
that, of the existing forms of intellectual property protection in
the United States, it was the least inappropriate.74
The literature concerning chip design protection 75 and the
legislative history of the chip design bills76 extensively re-
viewed the reasons that chip designs either "fit" or did not "fit"
within existing intellectual property forms. All commentators
who engaged in such review considered trade secret, patent,
and copyright; some also added unfair competition to the cast of
possibilities. 77 It was certainly true that, if the choice was lim-
ited to the preexisting forms of protection, copyright did seem
the least inappropriate. Nevertheless, that did not mean that
copyright was, or could be made, appropriate.
Trade secret protection was clearly insufficient. Although
the designs and masks for a chip might well be considered im-
portant trade secrets of a company while the chip was under
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 147 (letter from
James Dykes, Vice President and General Manager, General Electric) ("No
other form of intellectual property protection is as appropriate to semiconduc-
tor designs [as copyright]....").
75. See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 7, at 411-51.
76. See, e.g., Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 90.
77. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 411-15.
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development, once sold on the market, the chip would reveal
the "secret" of its design. Any trade secret protection of the de-
sign would then evaporate.78
Patent law protection was also insufficient. Patent law is
the law that normally provides legal protection against unau-
thorized copies of utilitarian works.79 Thus, initially, it appears
to be the most appropriate form of legal protection for improve-
ments in the design of semiconductor chips. After all, chips
serve as the central processing elements and memories of most
computers,80 and the aim in redesigning chips is to improve
their efficiency and economy, not to improve their aesthetic ap-
peal.8 ' In fact, the first chip was patented, and other patents
have issued on improvements in chip design.8 2
The House Report, however, concisely describes the major
drawback of patent law as applied to protection of chip designs:
Patent law can protect the basic electronic circuitry for new
microprocessors or other new such products. But patent law does not
protect the particular layouts and design work performed by the dif-
ferent chip manufacturers in adapting those electronic circuits for a
particular industrial purpose, because the creativity involved does not
rise to the inventive level required by the patent laws. Yet, it is those
layouts and design works that consume the resources of the innovat-
ing firms and that are copied by free riders.8
3
In other words, the patent standard of invention84 would have
to be abandoned in order for patent law to protect all the new
chip designs that the industry wanted to have protected. Inven-
tion is the core tenet of patent law. Furthermore, it appears
that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from granting pat-
ents to improvements in the industrial arts that do not meet
78. See id. at 418-19.
79. Patent law gives protection to the inventors of new, nonobvious, and
useful processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and im-
provements of these sorts. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103
(West Supp. 1985).
80. See supra note 1.
81. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 21, at 819.
82. See D. HANSON, THE NEW ALCHEMISTS 96-98 (1982).
83. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5752 (footnote omitted).
84. This standard of invention is set out in § 103:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1985).
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the patent standard of inventionE5 So Congress, even if it had
wanted to, could not have amended patent law to provide pro-
tection for the majority of improvements in chip design.
State unfair competition law can also be used to protect
against certain unauthorized copies of products. There are two
varieties of the common law of unfair competition. One pro-
tects against the "passing off" of the defendant company's prod-
uct as if it had been made by the plaintiff.86 The other protects
against the defendant's misappropriation of a commercially val-
uable aspect of the plaintiff's product to the detriment of the
plaintiff.8 7 Because chip manufacturers were not complaining
of "passing off," this aspect of unfair competition law was not
useful to manufacturers searching for meaningful protectionsa
Furthermore, although the misappropriation type of unfair
competition would seem to apply to chip design piracy, serious
questions about the continuing validity of the misappropriation
doctrine have been raised by cases and commentators.8 9 So un-
fair competition law was not the solution to the chip design
protection problem.
Copyright, by comparison, looked like a haven. After all,
copyright law had long protected against direct copies of de-
signs,90 and it incorporated a relatively low standard of original-
ity 9 ' that the chip manufacturers could easily meet. In fact,
because the technical drawings of chip designs were already
copyrightable, it initially seemed a small step to extend protec-
tion to the masks and the chips themselves.
A Copyright Office spokesperson, however, testified before
85. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
86. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 411.
87. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238-42
(1918) (misappropriation of "fresh news" by competitor).
88. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 414.
89. The case of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918), is said to enjoy an uncertain status in the aftermath of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See D. CHISUM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
§ 16.04, at 16-40 to 16-42 (1980). State misappropriation law may also be at
least partially preempted by federal copyright or patent law or both. See, e.g.,
R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 487-93 (4th ed. 1985). Misap-
propriation, if recognized at all, has the further disadvantage of being a state
common law tort, the elements of which might well vary from place to place.
90. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960) (copyright protection given to fabric designs).
91. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-
03 (2d Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the author contributed something more than a trivial variation,
something recognizably 'his own.' ").
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the House and Senate Committees that copyright protection for
semiconductor chip designs would violate four fundamental
principles of copyright: (1) copyright does not protect useful ar-
ticles per se; (2) copyright protects a design only to the extent
that artistic features are capable of being separately identified
and capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects;
(3) a copyright in a drawing of a useful thing does not protect
against unauthorized duplications of the useful thing itself; and
(4) copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the
ideas, processes, plans, etc. that might be embodied therein.92
Abandoning these four fundamental principles of copyright law
would likely, as the House Report eventually concluded, pres-
ent "formidable philosophical, constitutional, legal and techni-
cal problems" in administering the law.9 3 So it appeared from
the review of these forms of protection that there was a "gap"
between patent and copyright law into which chip designs fell.
Congress had to decide whether to fill that gap, and, if so, how.
B. WHY PROTECT SOMETHING IN THE "GAP" BETWEEN
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT?
There have always been "gaps" between copyright and pat-
ent law. Neither copyright 94 nor patent law95 grant exclusive
rights to the discoverers of new ideas or principles of nature,
nor to the creators of new mathematical formulae or business
methods, no matter how original and creative these discoveries
of creations are. Even significant improvements in the design
of machinery or other utilitarian works will not be protected if
a knowledgeable artisan might have thought of them.96 Society
92. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 77 (testimony of Dorothy
Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs, Copyright Of-
fice); see also Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 27-
28.
93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5759; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (ideas, methods, processes, systems, and
discoveries not within the scope of copyright). Similarly, under the principles
of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), discussed supra note 7, neither mathe-
matical formulae nor business methods would be protected by copyright.
95. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (mathematical formu-
lae not patentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948) (ideas and discoveries of principles of nature not patentable); In re
Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (indexing system not patentable).
96. E.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). The Court
observed:
Unless more ingenuity and skill ... were required ... than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
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has long tolerated this state of affairs. In other words, just be-
cause there is a "gap" between copyright and patent law does
not mean it must be filled.
As the House Report on the chip design legislation indi-
cates, Congress generally allows utilitarian works to be freely
copied if they do not meet the patent standards of novelty and
invention.97 For chip designs, however, Congress made an ex-
ception. The House Committee perceived the chip to be "at the
vortex" of the new information society.98 "More than perhaps
any other invention, the semiconductor chip has brought us
into the information age." Laying out the pattern of circuits
so that hundreds of thousands or even a million. ° ° transistors
can be fit efficiently and economically onto the surface of a chip
is "a fine art and also a costly one."''1 1 The period of time from
the initial layout of the design to the successful manufacture of
the first chip can "take the innovating chip firm years, consume
thousands of hours of engineer and technician time, and cost
millions of dollars. The development costs for a single new
chip can reach $100 million."'10 2
By comparison, copying a chip's design is very cheap. In
several months, for a cost of less than $50,000, a pirate firm can
duplicate the mask work of an innovator. 0 3 The House Report
highlights the effect that this dramatic difference between de-
velopment and reproduction costs has on the incentive to
innovate:
Because the copyist firm does not have the enormous costs borne by
the innovator, such a firm can undersell the innovating firm and flood
the market with cheap copies of the semiconductor chip. In an indus-
try in which innovation is absolutely essential, such appropriation of
creativity is a devastating disincentive to innovating research and de-
velopment.... Moreover, the disincentive effect reaches other firms
who learn a lesson from the misfortune of others.1°4
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which con-
stitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the im-
provement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of an
inventor.
Id (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851)).
97. See supra text accompanying note 62.
98. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5751.
99. Id
100. Boraiko, supra note 1, at 421.




104. Id at 2-3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 5751-52.
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This piracy was perceived to be a clear threat, not only to the
health of the U.S. semiconductor industry, but to the growth of
American information industries.105
What seems clear from the House Report is that it was not
just because there was a "gap" between copyright and patent
law that Congress created a new form of legal protection, but
because there was a special kind of gap. The centrality of the
chip industry to the continued growth of the American econ-
omy and the dramatic disparity between development costs and
the costs of copying were the reasons Congress filled the gap in
this particular instance. In fact, everyone who participated in
the discussion agreed that some sort of legislation was neces-
sary to protect chip designs.'06
C. A SHORTER DURATION OF PROTECTION
There was also unanimity about creating a much shorter
duration of protection for chip designs than for ordinary copy-
righted works. 0 7 Even the commentator who argued for pro-
tection of chip designs under the Copyright Act of 1976
indicated that the full copyright term for chip designs would be
excessive. 08
The most frequently cited reason for creating a shorter
term of protection for chip designs was that the commercial life
of any specific chip layout was likely to be relatively short:
roughly two to five years in the normal case. 0 9 Ten years
would clearly provide an adequate time to recoup the invest-
ment made in the design of a particular product. Since it was
the inability to recoup research and development costs that
gave rise to the charges of piracy in the first place, it made
sense to grant a period of protection adequate to recoup costs,
but no longer.
105. Id- at 3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5752.
106. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. S5922 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of
Sen. Mathias) ("Chip piracy reduces the incentive for our innovative semicon-
ductor industry to invest in the development of new chips."); see also Schrader
Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 40.
107. Both of the semiconductor chip bills introduced in 1983 provided for a
ten-year term of protection rather than the much longer copyright term. See
supra note 32. The two bills introduced in 1984 also provided for a term of ten
years. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed. May
16, 1984); H.R. 5525, 98th Cong,. 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984).
108. See Comment, supra note 21, at 849-50; see also Oxman, supra note 7,
at 459.
109. See Comment, supra note 21, at 850.
[Vol. 70:471
1985] SUI GENERIS PROTECTION
There were other reasons for keeping the duration short.
One of the important purposes of the federal intellectual prop-
erty laws has always been the enrichment of the public domain
once the innovator has been given an opportunity to obtain
enough reward for his creative efforts to provide an incentive
to create. The House Report on the chip legislation reflects
this concern:
Copyright is an amalgam of property law principles bent to the ser-
vice of a rather simple bargain. A limited term of protection against
copying is granted to an author's original expression in exchange for
the dedication of that expression to the public domain at the end of
the term. The public ordinarily benefits at least twice from this bar-
gain: once, when the original expression is first created, and then
again when the expression is added to the public domain from which
anyone may borrow freely to fashion new works. Although a copy-
right belongs to an author during its term, the ultimate purpose of
this bargain is not to protect authors but rather to enrich the public
domain. The cardinal principle in copyright law, then, is that any de-
cision to extend the law or to recognize new interests ought to be
based on a realistic expectation that one day the public domain will
bear new fruit.1 10
The House Report stated that the chip law should also be
grounded in this expectation,111 and the shorter duration of
chip protection was an important aspect of this enrichment.
The House did not explain how it decided upon ten years
as an appropriate term of protection. One reason for such a
brief term may have been a desire to keep the chip protection
law roughly proportional to copyright and patent law. It would
have been grossly disproportionate to provide protection of chip
designs for, say, thirty years. If most chip designs could not be
patented because, although categorically eligible for patent pro-
tection, they would not meet the patent standard of invention,
it would not make sense to provide a greater duration of protec-
tion" 2 than would be available if the chip design had, in fact,
been nonobvious and patentable. The chip bill satisfied propor-
110. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5754 (quoting Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983) (statement of
David Lange, Professor of Law, Duke University)).
111. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5754. Whether the public domain will be enriched if the copyrighted
work is outmoded by the time the exclusive rights expire and the public has
the right to copy the work, is an interesting question. In the future, the com-
mercial life of chips may be longer than it has been in the recent past, in
which case something valuable will have been committed to the public domain.
112. Patent law provides only 17 years of protection for inventions. See 35
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tionality concerns by providing ten years of protection for new
chip designs.
D. A DIFFERENT SET OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
One reason the Senate eventually yielded to the House's
sui generis approach is that even the Senate bill created a kind
of sui generis scheme for chips. The Senate's "copyright" bill,
while physically included as part of copyright law, granted an
entirely different set of exclusive rights to mask work owners
than those exclusive rights granted to owners of all other copy-
righted material." 3
The Senate's 1984 version of the bill set out five exclusive
rights for mask works." 4 Not only were these five new rights
completely distinct from the exclusive rights granted to all
other copyright owners," 5 all five contradicted the longstand-
ing copyright rule that the manufacture of a utilitarian object
depicted in a copyrighted drawing does not infringe the copy-
right.1 6 The original version of the Senate bill also included an
exclusive right to use chip products embodying the design of a
protected mask work.117 That provision would, if enacted, have
meant that every person or company who purchased a com-
puter that, unbeknownst to them, included one or more pirated
chips, would have been liable for copyright infringement. This
U.S.C. § 154 (1982). For a discussion of comparative durations, see inzfra note
153.
113. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 33-34.
114. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed.
May 16, 1984). These five exclusive rights included the right:
(A) to embody the mask work in a mask;
(B) to distribute a mask embodying the mask work;
(C) to embody an image of the mask work in a semiconductor
chip product;
(D) in the manufacture of a semiconductor chip product, substan-
tially to reproduce, by optical, electronic, or other means, an image of
the mask work on material intended to be part of the semiconductor
chip product; and
(E) to distribute a semiconductor chip product made as described
in subparagraph (C) or (D) of this paragraph.
Id § 106(6).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The five exclusive rights of copyright are
the rights (1) to make copies of the copyrighted work, (2) to prepare derivative
works, (3) to distribute copies, (4) to perform the work publicly, and (5) to dis-
play the work publicly. Id
116. See supra note 19.
117. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983).
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was a highly significant change, because copyright law normally
does not control uses of copyrighted works and leaves the pur-
chaser of a "bootleg" copy of a copyrighted work free from lia-
bility.1 18 To temper the effect on innocent purchasers, the
Senate bill required the firm owning the protected design to
grant a compulsory license to users, and protected innocent in-
fringers by requiring them to pay only a reasonable royalty for
the privilege of being able to continue to use the pirated chip.119
This innocent infringer provision, like the use right, was unpar-
alleled in copyright law. 2 0
The chip law that was eventually passed gave chip owners
the exclusive right to make, import, and distribute chip prod-
ucts embodying the mask work designs.' 12 These rights were
distinct from the set of exclusive rights given to copyright own-
ers. The need to create a set of exclusive rights of substantially
different character than those traditionally available for copy-
right owners was an indication that copyright was not a suitable
vehicle for chip protection and that a sui generis approach was
preferable.122
E. REVERSE ENGINEERING
It is interesting to note that neither the chip law eventually
118. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 46
("[T"he 'use' right proposed here seems unrelated to anything known to any
copyright system, past or present, here or abroad.").
119. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5992-93 (daily ed.
May 4, 1983); see also Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43,
at 92-93. Professor Miller testified:
I think one would have to rely for a justification of this use concept
on a combination of the fact that these mask works are unique; they
move rapidly. Many of them come in from abroad. Many of them are
produced by fly-by-night organizations that are unavailable when you
are trying to seek legal redress and you have a very serious pragmatic
problem in getting at them.
ICE
120. See Schrader Statement, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 44
("[Tihe innocent infringer provision would insulate unconscious infringers
from copyright liability (traditional copyright law protects against both con-
scious and unconscious infringement).") (footnote omitted). The law eventu-
ally enacted does not include a use right, although it does contain an innocent
infringement provision that allows those who unwittingly import or distribute
pirated chips to be relieved of liability for more than a reasonable royalty. See
17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. II 1984). In addition, the owner was given
the exclusive right "to induce or knowingly to cause another person" to make,
import, or distribute chip products embodying the mask work. Id § 905(3).
122. For a discussion of the need for a different set of exclusive rights for
computer programs than copyright provides, see iqfra notes 228-247.
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enacted nor any of its predecessor bills contained a provision
giving the chip designer an exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based on the protected chip design.123 In fact, the Act'2A
and its legislative history'2 5 make it abundantly clear that per-
sons who "reverse engineer" the layout of a particular chip-
that is, persons who use the protected design as a basis for their
own chip design-will be shielded from liability so long as they
do not copy the chip exactly or make only insignificant changes.
This is so despite the fact that the reverse engineer may be tak-
ing a partial "free ride" on the research and development in-
vestment of a more innovative firm.'26
There was strong support for a clear statutory recognition
of a right to reverse engineer. Although some witnesses be-
lieved that the copyright "fair use"' 27 doctrine would suffice to
allow legitimate reverse engineering,128 others felt that there
was a need for a clear statement in case the fair use doctrine
was construed more narrowly than this.129 Without the reverse
engineering provision, the chip act might not have had the sub-
stantial industry support that it did. 30
123. All copyright owners have exclusive rights to prepare derivative
works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). Derivative works are defined in the copy-
right statute as:
work[s] based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
125. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5770-72.
126. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 34 (testimony of F. Thomas
Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.).
127. The fair use doctrine is often defined as "'a privilege in others than
the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner by the copyright."' Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITE_-
ARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). For the factors to
be considered in fair use determinations, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
128. See, e.g., 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 34 (testimony of F.
Thomas Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.); see also
Comment, supra note 21, at 848.
129. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 103-04 (testimony of
Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel, Association of American Publishers); idi
at 114-15 (statement of NEC Electronics U.S.A., Inc.).
130. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 100-01 (statement of a
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Utilitarian works have intentionally not been included in
the copyright statute, so there has never been occasion to create
a copyright reverse engineering rule. If the copyright law had
been extended to include utilitarian works, it would probably
have been necessary to explicitly recognize a right to reverse
engineer.
F. FEATURES OF THE CHIP LAw UNLIKE COPYRIGHT
The main reason the House Committee rejected copyright
as a form of legal protection for chip designs was that chip de-
signs did not comport with copyright's long tradition of not pro-
tecting utilitarian works. This subsection focuses on why it was
a good idea not to call the new chip act a "copyright law."
The main reason not to call the new law protecting chip
designs a "copyright" law is that it really was not a "copyright"
law. There are, of course, some respects in which the new chip
protection scheme resembles copyright. But there are many
features of the law that more closely resemble patent law, and
many that can be found in neither copyright nor patent law.
Unless one is prepared to confound the definition of "copy-
right," it would be better to call something this different by a
new name.
There are a number of ways in which the chip design law
resembles copyright. Perhaps the clearest resemblance is that
the chip design law protects the particularities of "original" de-
signs.131 The concept of "originality" was intended to have a
copyright-like meaning.132 The chip law also states that "[i]n
no case does protection . . . for a mask work extend to any
panel including A. Biddle, President, Computer and Communications Industry
Association). The original version of the Senate copyright bill did not contain
such a provision; the modified Senate bill and the act finally made into law
did, however, contain a special reverse engineering provision. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 906(a) (Supp. II 1984) (chip act); S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 130 CONG.
REC. S5838 (daily ed. May 16, 1984) (modified Senate bill).
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984).
132. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5768. There is one respect in which the chip law is different from
copyright law concerning the requirement of originality. The chip law ex-
cludes from protection "designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in
the semiconductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a way
that, considered as a whole, is not original." 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II
1984). This provision suggests that the chip law standard of originality will be
higher than the copyright standard. Under copyright law, "[o]riginality means
only that the work owes its origin to the author, ie., it is independently cre-
ated, and not copied from other works." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01[A], at 2-8 (1985) (footnote omitted).
19851
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idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work
....- 133 This provision parallels copyright law.' T  The chip
law allows the owner of a mask work to register for protection
by applying to the Copyright Office,135 and the examination
procedure to be followed by the Office in determining whether
to issue a certificate of registration will be of the same minimal
sort as for copyrighted works. 136 There are indications in the
legislative history that a copyright-like "substantial similarity"
test might be used to judge infringements of the chip law,137
although there are other indications that a new test might be
developed.138 Some commentators anticipated that problems
might arise when applying the copyright substantial similarity
test to a subject matter where utilitarian considerations were
involved in the design process. 13 9 Finally, the generous remedy
provisions of copyright,140 including recovery of the defendant's
profits or, in the alternative, statutory damages, have been
adopted in the chip law.' 4 '
The chip law has other similarities to copyright that are ac-
tually features common to both patent and copyright law. For
example, there is a provision allowing the owner to affix to the
product a notice of his claim of protection under the federal
133. 17 U.S.C. § 902(c) (Supp. II 1984).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (Supp. II 1984).
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 908 (Supp. II 1984).
137. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
138. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5775-76.
139. See, e.g., 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 117-19 (statement of
Patent Task Force of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE)). The Task Force expressed many concerns about the potential for
mistaken judgments about copying due to the significantly different nature of
chips as compared with novels. I& They pointed out that "[t]he laws of phys-
ics do not allow the wide open possibilities as those in writing a novel." Id. at
118. The Task Force also pointed out that even very subtle changes in chip
designs may represent significantly different designs and that juries may be
misled by relying on visual perceptions of the designs. Id. at 119. For a discus-
sion of similar problems in applying the copyright infringement test to
software, see infra notes 253-257.
140. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-505 (1982).
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 911(b)-(c) (Supp. II 1984); see also id. § 911(e) (im-
poundment provision). Another respect in which the chip law resembles copy-
right is in the prohibition against direct ownership by the government.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 903(d) (Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
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chip statute.142 The notice is to consist of an "*M*" and the
name of the owner of the work.14 3 This notice is similar to that
for copyrighted works1 " and patented works.145 There are sev-
eral other features common to all three forms.14
The chip law also has a number of similarities to patent
law. As with patents,147 affixing a notice of chip protection is
discretionary. 148 The chip law also resembles patent law by
protecting against the unauthorized 'manufacture of mask
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 909 (Supp. II 1984).
143. Id The letter "M" in circle is also permitted. Id-
144. The copyright notice consists of three elements: (1) an indication of a
claim of right through the use of the symbol "©", or the abbreviation "Copr.",
or the word "Copyright"; (2) the year of first publication; and (3) the name of
the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982). This notice must be displayed
in such a manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim. 17
U.S.C. § 401(c) (1982).
145. Patentees may affix "pat." or "patent" and the patent's number to the
goods or packaging for the patented item. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).
146. Other respects in which the chip law resembles copyright and patent
law include: (1) the transfer of ownership rights, compare 17 U.S.C. § 903
(Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 204-205 (1982) and 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982); (2)
the limitation on the creator's rights to prohibit subsequent sales of the copies,
compare 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) and
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895); (3) the prima facie
character of the federal certificate in litigation, compare 17 U.S.C. § 908(f)
(Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982) and 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982); (4) the
establishment of fees for processing applications, compare 17 U.S.C. § 908(d)
(Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. § 708 (1982) and 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1982); (5) the
ability to appeal a decision not to issue the certificate, compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 910(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984) with 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 7.21[A], at 7-152 (1985) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 132-134 (1982); (6) the need to de-
posit some identifying materials in order to obtain a certificate, compare 17
U.S.C. § 908(c) (Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 407-408 (1982) and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 111-114 (1982); the federal law's preemption of state laws concerning that
subject matter, compare 17 U.S.C. § 912(c) (Supp. II 1984) with 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1982) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 909 (Supp. II 1984) (owner of mask work may affix no-
tice) (emphasis added); of. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982) (copyright statute provides
that whenever a work protectable under the law is published, a copyright no-
tice shall be attached to it). Although the Copyright Act of 1976, as compared
to the 1909 Act, is more generous toward those who inadvertently omit copy-
right notices on some copies, compare 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) (1982) (copyright
not invalidated when notice has been omitted from "a relatively small number
of copies") with Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080
(copyright not invalidated when notice omitted from "a particular copy or cop-
ies") (repealed 1976), it is still true that a failure to attach a copyright notice
can result in a determination that the work has been dedicated to the public
domain. See 2 M. NIMMR, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 7.14[A][1], at 7-102 (1985).
By contrast, failure to affix a patent notice will only preclude damage recov-
eries unless the infringer had actual notice of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 287
(1982).
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works or the semiconductor chip products embodying the mask
design.149 Overall, the chip designer's exclusive rights under
the chip law more closely resemble the exclusive rights of pat-
ent law than copyright law. 50 Additionally, it is not an in-
fringement of the mask work to make a copy for teaching or
evaluative purposes,151 just as it is not an infringement to make
a copy of a patented device for experimental purposes. 52 The
duration of chip design protection more nearly resembles pat-
ent than copyright law: ten years as compared with seventeen
years for patent and at least fifty years for copyright. 153 Fur-
thermore, there is a requirement that the owner of a mask
work register the design within two years of its first commer-
cial exploitation or be barred from any protection under the
federal law.15 This again more closely resembles patent than
copyright law.155
There are also many unique provisions in the new chip law.
149. Recall that the copyright on a drawing does not extend to making the
thing depicted therein if it is a useful thing. See supra note 19.
150. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 905(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984) (owner has exclusive
right to reproduce, import, and distribute chips embodying the mask work de-
sign) with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (owner has exclusive right to make, use, and
sell invention) and 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (owner has exclusive right to make
copies, prepare derivative works, distribute, and where applicable, give public
performances or make public display of works). Given the manufacturing ori-
entation of both the patent and the chip laws, the rejection of the derivative
work right for chips, and the inapplicability of public performance and display
rights, it is fair to conclude that the chip law's exclusive rights are more pat-
ent-like than copyright-like.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. II 1984).
152. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTs § 16.03[1] (1985).
153. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 904(b) (Supp. II 1984) (10 year duration for chip
designs) with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (17 year duration for utility patent) and 17
U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982) (75 years from first publication for works made for hire
and author's life plus 50 years for other works). Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982) (de-
sign patent protected for applicant's choice of three and one-half, seven or
fourteen years). Patent protection runs from the date of its issuance. Peck v.
Collins, 103 U.S. 660, 664 (1881). Chip design protection will run from the date
of registration or first commeicial exploitation, whichever comes first. 17
U.S.C. § 904(a) (Supp. II 1984). Copyright protection, by contrast, attaches
from the time the work is first created, if created after January 1, 1978, or
from the earlier of the date of first publication or the year of creation in the
case of anonymous or pseudonymous works, or works made for hire. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a), (c) (1982).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 908(a) (Supp. II 1984).
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (inventors may not "publicly use" their
inventions for more than one year before filing for a patent application). Com-
mercial exploitation of the invention is one of the "public uses" that can give
rise to a statutory bar to a patent application. See, e.g., Call v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 442 F.2d 65, 68 (1971); 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 6.02[5] (1985). Copy-
right has no comparable rule.
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In addition to the new definitional provisions,156 new features
of the law include the President's power to proclaim United
States protection for foreign nationals' products when the for-
eign nations provide comparable protection, 157 the ten year
term of protection,13s the importation provisions,159 and the
provisions on innocent infringement, 6° among others.161 Given
these many differences from traditional copyright law, it is not
surprising that Congress in the end decided that the form of
protection appropriate for chips was so different from "copy-
right" that to call the new law "copyright" would have dis-
torted the meaning of the word.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE
COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
There is something to be said for having two, and only two,
primary forms of federal intellectual property law: copyright
and patent.16 2 To develop a sui generis form of protection for
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. II 1984) (defining "semiconductor chip prod-
uct," "mask work," "fixed," "distribute," "commercially exploit," "owner," "in-
nocent purchaser," "notice of protection," and "infringing semiconductor
product").
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984). Copyright has a provision
that entitles foreign authors to protection under American copyright law if
they are nationals of a country with which the United States has a copyright
treaty or nationals of a country that is a party to the Universal Copyright Con-
vention. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1982). Additionally, the President may issue a
proclamation entitling foreign nationals to this protection. Id
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 904(b) (Supp. II 1984).
159. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 905(2), 910(c) (Supp. II 1984). The chip law is unique
in that the right to control imports is an integral part of the set of exclusive
rights. Id. Copyright law has separate provisions concerning imports. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (1982).
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984). The only copyright provision that
remotely resembles the chip law innocent infringement provision is the statu-
tory damages provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982), which permits the court
to reduce statutory damages if the defendant had no reason to believe her acts
were infringing. Librarians and public broadcast companies are eligible for a
complete remittance if the infringement was innocent. See id
161. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 913-914 (Supp. II 1984) (transitional provisions);
id. § 904(c) (reliance on calendar years to determine duration); id. § 912 (the
chip law's relation to other laws).
162. Trademark and trade secret law are sometimes spoken of as types of
intellectual property law, but these laws are, to a large extent, state laws and
they have a different orientation than patent and copyright law which protect
intellectual innovations. Trademark law protects source significance; trade se-
cret law protects confidential relationships and the right to be free from indus-
trial espionage and other tortious conduct. In view of these differences, it is
fair to call patent and copyright law the primary forms of federal intellectual
property law, at least before the passage of the chip law. See also supra note 4.
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each new innovation would create an extremely complicated
body of law, which in turn would give rise to difficulties in ad-
ministration and enforcement. To strike a new social bargain
for each innovation would be foolhardy and unworkable.163 All
prior innovations seem to have been adequately protected by
simply expanding the boundaries of copyright or patent law. It
would be foolish to embark on an expedition for the perfect sui
generis protection each time something new comes along to
challenge preexisting legal boundaries.
In order to have an intellectual property system in which
there was only copyright and patent law, and in which there
would never be a need to create a sui generis scheme for any
new subject matter, it would be necessary to reconceptualize
copyright and patent in ways that would free the systems from
the historical subject matters to which they have been ap-
plied.164 It would be necessary to rethink the legal forms, pare
them down to a more essential base, and adjust their rules ac-
cordingly. It would be necessary to reconceive the social bar-
gain they now reflect. 165
As far as copyright is concerned, the rule against protecting
utilitarian things would have to be abandoned. Copyright law
might be reconceived as a system which protects as "works of
163. The Doge of Venice in the sixteenth century apparently administered
an intellectual property system in which he and his council made case by case
determinations of the duration of protection to be accorded each new book or
invention, based on their assessment of its benefit to the public. See, e.g., Out-
line of the History of the United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 21-
24 (1936) (discussing the Venetian intellectual property system and Galileo's
petition to the Doge for exclusive rights to an invention). Such a system is not
feasible today. Nowadays, one cannot administer an intellectual property sys-
tem by such an ad hoc process, giving a set of rock lyrics protection for two
years but giving a great symphony one hundred years of protection. The sys-
tem we have gives a new type of bottle cap the same length of protection as
the first microprocessor chip. That may be absurd, in the sense that the social
benefit from the bottle cap and from the microprocessor may be quite differ-
ent, but it is the price we pay for simplicity in administration.
164. It is readily apparent that copyright law is weighed down with con-
cepts that pertain to its earliest subject matter, namely books. The clearest ex-
ample of this is the notion of "publication" as a significant copyright event.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 401(a) (1982). Books get published. It is somewhat silly
to talk about "publishing" a sculpture or a pantomime, let alone a chip mask
or a machine. Similarly, patent law is weighed down with machine-oriented
imagery. See, e.g., In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (expert
system program denied patentability because it did not transform matter) (cit-
ing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
165. For a discussion of the social bargains that copyright and patent law
now embody, see infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
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authorship" any physical rendering of intellectual labor'6 so
long as it had the minimal degree of "originality" that copy-
right has historically required, 67 and was "fixed" in some tan-
gible medium of expression.168 Under this new system, not
only would the words of a play be copyrightable, but also the
design of a building, whether in plans or in the final con-
structed form, the shape of a chair or an airplane wing, and the
configuration of a machine and its inner working parts.
Patent law would similarly need to be reconceived to pro-
tect nonobvious ideas regardless of the kind of works to which
they might pertain. If someone came up with a nonobvious idea
for processing information, a nonobvious mathematic formula
or solution to a well-known problem, or a nonobvious design
for a filing system, lamp, or sculpture, it would be patentable.
This reconception of the two systems would, of course,
mean that a tremendous number of previously unpatentable
nonobvious ideas and previously uncopyrightable designs would
receive federal monopoly rights. The "gaps" between copyright
and patent would be filled, and all new subject matters would
fall somewhere within the dual system. It would be possible to
get a patent for the nonobvious ideas embodied in either a book
or a machine, and a copyright on the particularities of the ex-
pression or implementation of those ideas. Upon the expiration
of the patent, the particularities of the book's expression or the
machine's configuration could still be protected by copyright,
although the nonobvious ideas would now be open to imitation
so long as they were implemented in a different way. In this
reconceived system, most semiconductor chip designs would get
only copyright protection because most chip designs, while
clearly products of substantial intellectual labor, would be obvi-
ous to people skilled in the art of chip design. 69
166. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (originality requirement); see also supra
note 91 and accompanying text for the meaning of "originality" in copyright.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring that a work of authorship be
"fixed" in a tangible medium of expression to qualify for copyright protection);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of ex-
pression "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
169. Similarly, the vast majority of computer programs would be protected
only under copyright because no more than a small fraction contain nonobvi-
ous ideas. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that it
was not clear if any programs were patentable, but even if they were, few
could satisfy the standards). Genetically engineered products would likewise
be eligible for copyright protection. See, e.g., Kayton, Copyright in Living Ge-
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Some of those who testified in favor of including chip de-
signs under copyright law seem to have been operating on the
assumption that such a reconception was desirable or had al-
ready occurred.170 At one of the Congressional hearings con-
ducted in 1983 on protection of chip designs, Professor Arthur
Miller, who had chaired the CONTU subcommittee, which was
responsible for studying the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams,171 testified that the decision to make chips copyrightable
was a logical extension of Congress's earlier decision to make
machine-readable computer programs copyrightable.172 In fact,
the argument Miller used in his testimony closely paralleled
the argument CONTU had used to support its conclusion that
machine-readable computer programs could be copyrighted.173
As in the CONTU Report,174 Miller mentioned the broad and
dynamic meaning of the constitutional term "writing.' 75 To
show that this new technology was "writing," Miller analogized
netically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191, 197-218 (1982) (argu-
ing for recognition of copyright in such works and for simultaneous copyright
and patent protection). Nonobvious genetically engineered products could also
be patented. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-18 (1980)
(recognizing patentability of genetically engineered products, in this case,
bacteria).
170. See, e.g., Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 87-
99; 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 137-39 (letter from Jocelyn West
Brittin and James E. Ballowe, Jr., law offices of Boothe, Prichard & Dudley).
But see 1983 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 51-63 (testimony of L. Ray Pat-
terson, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law) (arguing that a
sound conceptual basis for copyright would be undermined if semiconductor
chips were protected under copyright law).
171. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. The subcommittee of
the commission that dealt with the copyrightability of machine-readable pro-
grams consisted of Professor Arthur Miller, E. Gabriel Perle of Time, Inc., and
retired New York Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld. Id.
172. Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 97 ("I just
simply cannot see conceptually how you can negate the copyrightability of
mask works and accept computer programs and accept code books, which are
just collections of unintelligible gibberish designed to produce a utilitarian
function.").
173. Compare Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at
87-98 with CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-26. There is some dif-
ference in the ordering of the elements of the argument, and there are some
new elements in the chip argument, but nevertheless there are substantial and
important similarities in the two arguments. It is also important to note that
CONTU was not unanimous in its recommendation of copyright protection for
software. The novelist John Hersey and consumer lawyer Rhoda Karpatkin
dissented, and the well-known copyright scholar Melville Nimmer concurred
with some serious reservations about the advisability of extending copyright
protection to software. See id. at 26-38.
174. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
175. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 88, 97.
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it to objects already clearly recognized as "writings" and within
the bounds of copyright.176 He reviewed the inadequacies of
other existing forms of protection, and, once again, suggested
that copyright was appropriate because it was the least inappro-
priate.177 Miller curtly dismissed the utilitarian objection to the
copyrightability of chip designs, and implied that anyone who
was caught up in it was elevating form over substance.178
Miller also dismissed the argument that by protecting chip de-
signs, copyright would be granting patent-like protection of
ideas and not just expression.179 Miller noted that CONTU
overcame similar objections in extending copyright protection
to machine-readable computer programs, and urged that the
Senate Committee have the courage to surmount similar fears
concerning chip protection. 8 0 So long as it was possible to de-
sign a chip another way than by copying, or possible to write
different programs to implement the same function, Miller felt
there would be no idea/expression problem.' 8 '
176. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 88-89
(likening chip designs to scrimshaw, works by Jackson Pollock, Mondrian, and
Christo, and various other objects); see also CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 15 (likening programs to novels, poems, and plays.).
177. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 90 (af-
ter eliminating patent and trade secret, copyright is left); see also CONTU FI-
NAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-19. The report stated that "of the various
potential modes of protection, copyright has the smallest negative impact." Id
at 18.
178. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 89
("Surely it is not that mask works are useful that disenables them from copy-
right protection."); see also CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (copy-
right has not been denied to things on account of their utilitarian aspects).
Professor Miller made the following remarks at the 1983 Senate hearings:
A nation that awards a 75 year copyright monopoly to an E.T. piggy
bank or an E.T. cushion or an E.T. lunch pail, and then gets itself bol-
lixed up in a conceptual debate as to whether a mask work is too utili-
tarian, has got its priorities fouled up.
... Io worry about [the chip law's] placement in title 17 versus
title XX is worrying about a shell game.
Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 89-90. Professor
Miller also said: "It just seems to me that there is no rational way of distin-
guishing that blown-up photograph of a chip from Jackson Pollock or Mond-
rian or Albers." Id at 97.
179. See Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 89 (dis-
missing this argument by noting that nothing in proposed legislation gives an
owner a monopoly in a chip or would keep anyone else from producing them).
180. Id ("Thiat was an issue that [CONTU] faced in the late seventies. It is
an old chestnut. It is a conceptual problem which, when you scratch at it
tends to disappear.").
181. Id at 89-90; see also CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 20.
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Given how calmly Congress reacted to the inclusion of
computer programs in the copyright realm, it was somewhat
surprising that Congress balked at a continuation of this expan-
sive trend and took a step back toward the more traditional, if
confining, views of copyright and patent. It was logical to make
chips copyrightable after having made machine-readable com-
puter programs copyrightable. Miller's argument in favor of
copyright protection for chip designs was essentially identical to
the argument CONTU made in favor of copyright protection
for machine-readable computer programs. The rejection of
Professor Miller's conception of copyright for chip protection
demonstrates a congressional judgment that he misunderstood
the nature of the utilitarian objection18 2 and its position at the
core of copyright law. That same misconception pervades the
CONTU Report on the copyrightabiity of computer
182. In Miller's view copyright has long protected "useful works," which is
why he regarded the utility of computer chips and computer programs to be
insignificant. But an examination of the examples he gives of "useful works"
protected by copyright-newspapers, dictionaries, and "E.T." lunch pails, see
Miller Testimony, 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 89-reveals that
Professor Miller does not fully comprehend the special meaning of "utility" as
it is used in copyright parlance.
Newspapers and dictionaries are "useful" in the ordinary sense of the
word, but not in the copyright sense of the word. Copyright has traditionally
treated as "nonutilitarian," and hence copyrightable, those works whose only
uses, and whose value, lay in the conveyance of information or the display of
an appearance. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Samuelson,
supra note 7, at 732-36. Copyright regards those works that have additional
functions beyond these two and whose value is in large measure attributable
to those other functions as utilitarian. Newspapers and dictionaries convey in-
formation. This is what they are intended to do. What value they have is de-
rived from this utility. Therefore, they are not "useful" in the sense that
would bar them from receiving copyright protection. "E.T." lunch pails would
at first blush seem to be uncopyrightable on account of their "usefulness," but
a closer look reveals that a copyright would not protect the useful aspect of
the lunch pail. Copyright will only protect the "E.T." lunch pail to the extent
that the "E.T." pictorial design can be identified separately from the lunch pail
and can exist independently from it. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The "E.T."
picture displays an appearance, is valuable for that reason, and is therefore
copyrightable. That does not mean, however, that the lunch pail qua lunch
pail is copyrightable. The lunch pail qua lunch pail has utility beyond the con-
veyance of information and the display of an appearance, which is why it tradi-
tionally has been regarded as beyond the scope of copyright law. Anyone can
make a lunch pail in the same shape, and indeed they have. It is only if a
manufacturer wants to put an "E.T." picture on the pail that the manufacturer
needs permission from the owner of the "E.T." copyright. Miller's use of these
items-newspapers, the dictionary, and the "E.T." lunch pail-as examples of
"useful works" protected by copyright shows that he misunderstood the copy-




IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE CHIP ACT TO
SOFTWARE: THE NEED FOR SUI GENERIS
PROTECTION
Congress's decision to reject copyright law as the mecha-
nism for protecting computer chip designs was wise, and reaf-
firms the principle that copyright protection should not be
extended to utilitarian subject matters. Congress should now
reassess its earlier decision to extend copyright protection to
machine-readable computer programs,'84 another utilitarian
subject matter. The same fundamental concerns about the du-
ration of protection and the rights created by copyright which
led to passage of the chip law, suggest that copyright law is not
the proper vehicle for protection of computer programs, and
that a sui generis approach is needed. 8 5
183. See Samuelson, supra note 7 at 727-49; see also CONTU FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 28-30 (dissent of Commissioner John Hersey). In his
thoughtful concurrence to the majority report, CONTU Commissioner Nim-
mer expressed dismay at the majority's
failure to articulate any rationale which would not equally justify
copyright protection for the tangible expression of any and all original
ideas (whether or not computer technology, business or otherwise). If
literary works are to be so broadly construed, the Copyright Act be-
comes a general misappropriation law, applicable as well in what has
traditionally been regarded as a patent arena, and indeed, also in
other areas which neither copyright nor patent law has previously
extended.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 26 (emphasis in the original).
184. This author is not the only person to have called for a sui generis
scheme for software. Richard Stern, a noted copyright lawyer, has stated:
"Software is clearly different enough and important enough to justify its own
system of legislative protection." Stern, The Case of the Purloined Object Code:
Can It Be Solved? Part 2, BYTE, Oct. 1982, at 210, 222. See also Galbi, Proposal
for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y 280 (1970); Goldberg, Legal Protection for EDP Software, 18 DATAMA-
TION 66, 70 (1972); Karjala, Lessons from the Computer Software Debate in
Japan, 1984 Aiz. ST. L.J. 53, 61-81; Comment, Softright: A Legislative Solu-
tion to the Problem of Users' and Producers' Rights in Computer Software, 44
LA. L. REv. 1413, 1448-55 (1984); cf. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software:
A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 760-84 (discussing various
proposals for sui generis protection of software); Note, Semiconductor Chip
Protection" Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV.
249, 252 (1985) (arguing for sui generis protection for new technologies such as
semiconductor chips because legal distinctions between writings and machines
which have pervaded copyright and patent tradition should not be ignored in
attempting to protect new technologies).
185. There are, of course, a number of arguments in favor of retaining
copyright protection for computer programs. One is inertia. It would take a
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A. THE UTILITARIAN NATURE OF MACHINE-READABLE
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Machine-readable computer programs are "utilitarian" in a
copyright sense.186 Because in the developmental stages pro-
major effort to design a new law that would be an improvement over copy-
right, and perhaps an even greater effort to amass the political consensus
needed to get a new scheme passed. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 184, at 760-
67 (discussing problems with previously proposed sui generis proposals for
software). Another argument is that however often the software industry
complains about copyright's inadequacies, it has already started adjusting to
copyright law, and has found copyright useful enough to resist calls for a sui
generis scheme. Yet another argument is that many other countries have now
adopted copyright as a form of protection for software. See, e.g., M.
KEPLINGER, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS: A SURVEY AND
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND CASE LAw (1984) (study sponsored
by the World Intellectual Property Organization of how twelve countries have
decided to treat software). For the United States to abandon copyright and
create a new form of legal protection for programs, especially after the pres-
sure it has brought to bear on other nations to accept the copyright regime,
see, e.g., U.S. Opposes Japanese Proposal for Limited Software Protection, 27
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 669, 424 (March 1, 1984); S. 339,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S908 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985) (bill would
condition protection under U.S. copyright law for foreign nationals' software
on whether their countries granted equivalent protection to U.S. nationals'
software), would certainly be embarrassing and might create substantial inter-
national problems. Moreover, there are some features of copyright law which
are very attractive to the software industry and which are unquestionably ap-
propriate for programs. As strong as these reasons may seem, however, there
are stronger reasons for creating a sui generis protection for machine-readable
programs. If the international dimension of the problem were the only sub-
stantial reason to retain copyright protection for software, and if a more ap-
propriate system were devised, it would seem wiser to adopt the better system
than to continue with copyright out of respect for its short (and unsatisfac-
tory) history of protecting software.
186. There is one very simple but important difference between a
book which contains a set of instructions about how to do a particular
task and a computer program in machine-readable form which con-
tains a similar, if considerably more elaborate, set of instructions on
the same subject: The former informs a human being about how the
task might be done; the latter does the task. Computer programs now
operate traffic light systems, update inventories, post sales, regulate
pacemakers, tune radios, pump gas, and control car engines, among
other tasks.
Programs dictate what kind of machine a computer will be. To
the extent the program causes the machine to be something other
than a book or an audiovisual work and to the extent it makes the
computer a dishwashing machine or a gas pump, the traditional rules
against copyright protection for utilitarian works and for machine
parts ought to be enforced. This is particularly appropriate because
the same kind of machine, if not a computer, would be disqualified
from copyright protection under these rules. It is absurd to deny
copyright protection to the shape of a television set on account of its
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grammers are said to "write" programs, 8 7 a process that re-
quires the preparation of a "source code" setting forth the
sequence of hardware instructions necessary for a computer to
perform a desired function, it has been easy to focus on this
source code as a basis for asserting the copyrightability of its
machine-readable counterpart.1as The process of transforming
source code into machine-readable form is shrouded in mystery
to the uninitiated. This, and the fact that programs may be
stored on media such as cassette tapes, seems to have obscured
recognition of the utilitarian character of these machine-reada-
ble programs.
The utility of machine-readable programs, however, is un-
deniable. It is commonly recognized in the computer science
community that a customized piece of hardware can be built to
do any task that might otherwise be performed by running a
program on a general purpose computer. 8 9 In other words,
partially utilitarian character while allowing full copyright protection
to the operative mechanism controlling the tuning of the television
picture if that mechanism is run by a computer program. Copyright
law would not have protected the tuning device before it was comput-
erized. Congress could not have intended such an inconsistent result.
Having been so firm about limiting copyright protection to nonu-
tilitarian works, Congress could not have understood its decision to
extend copyright protection to computer programs to be a decision to
extend such protection regardless of the program's utility.
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 727, 74849 (footnotes omitted).
Before computer programs, there may not have been any "literary works"
that were directly capable of operating a machine, although there are a few
cases in which things that could be within the definition of "literary works"
have been denied copyright protection because of their utility. See, e.g., Taylor
Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1943) (circu-
lar chart used in conjunction with temperature recording device not copyright-
able because of utilitarian character), cert denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944).
187. See supra note 11.
188. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10, 15 (emphasiz-
ing the characterization of computer programs as "writings" and analogizing
programs to other written works such as novels and plays); Iskrant, The Im-
pact of Multiple Forms of Computer Programs on Their Adequate Protection
by Copyright 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYM'. (ASCAP) 92, 107-19 (1970) (concluding
that computer programs are "writings" and analogous to phonograph records).
189. See, e.g., T. PRATT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN AND IMPLE-
MENTATION 19 (2d ed. 1984). Mr. Pratt stated:
Given a precise definition of a computer, it is always possible to real-
ize the computer in hardware, that is, to construct a hardware device
whose machine language is precisely that of the defined com-
puter .... In suggesting this possibility we are appealing to the im-
portant basic principle behind computer design: Any precisely
defined algorithm or data structure may be realized in hardware. Be-
cause a computer is simply a collection of algorithms and data struc-
tures, we may assume that its hardware realization is a possibility,
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software is simply a substitute for certain hardware parts that
would otherwise have to be constructed to make a single pur-
pose machine capable of doing precisely the same task that the
software could do. Computer programs in machine-readable
form make it possible for one machine-a computer-to be
many machines.19° Programs, in effect, tell the computer what
kind of machine to be. That is why computer scientists refer to
modern computers as "universal machines."' 91
Nonutility is a fundamental principle of copyright law.
Congress acknowledged that fact when it enacted sui generis
protection for semiconductor chips. 92 Machine-readable com-
puter programs are utilitarian, and including them in the sub-
ject matter of copyright was a mistake that threatens to distort
the fabric of copyright law. Like semiconductor chips,
machine-readable programs fall into the "gap" between tradi-
tional patent and copyright subject matters. The chip protec-
tion debate suggests that sui generis protection should not be
provided to these "gap" subject matters unless the subject mat-
ter is one of substantial importance to our economic future and
there is a dramatic disparity between the costs of development
and the costs of piracy. 9 3 Software satisfies these two criteria
regardless of the complexity of the computer or its associated
machine language.
190. To be precise, we must realize that it is not the application pro-
gram alone that performs the task we ask the computer to do. Nor is
it the hardware alone. Rather, it is the complex hierarchy of pro-
grams and hardware that, while interacting with one another, works
as a unit to perform a particular application task.. . . For functional
purposes, the programs in a computer are part of the machine; pro-
grams are only substitutes for hardware....
Computer programs make it possible for one machine to perform
the functions of many machines. When a word processing program is
operating in a computer, the computer is a word processor. When a
videogame program is operating in a computer, the computer is a
videogame machine. When a digital watch program is operating in a
computer, the computer is a digital watch. With each new program,
the computer is a new machine .... The program determines what
kind of machine the computer will be.
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 680.
191. See, e.g., A. HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA 293-95, 318-21 (1983).
Hodges quotes the mathematician and early computer scientist Alan Turing.
"We do not need to have an infinity of different machines doing different jobs.
A single one will suffice. The engineering problem of producing various ma-
chines for various jobs is replaced by the office work of 'programming' the uni-
versal machine to do these jobs." Id at 293.
192. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
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in the same way that chips do.194 Thus a sui generis form of
protection should be developed to give software producers the
protection they require without distorting copyright law.
B. THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT SOCIAL BARGAIN THAN
COPYRIGHT PROVIDES
Looking at federal intellectual property law macroscopi-
cally, society makes a social contract or bargain with authors,
inventors, and other creative people, whereby society gives
them certain rights in exchange for which they give certain
things to the public.195 Under c'opyright law, society grants au-
thors certain exclusive rights, primarily control over the copy-
ing and distribution of copies for at least fifty years,196 in
exchange for the public benefits derived from widespread dis-
semination of the works' ideas and expression upon publica-
tion.197 Although copyright law has been solicitous of an
author's desire not to publish at all,198 it has traditionally as-
sumed that if an author does decide to reap commercial re-
wards, the social bargain will be carried out.'9
The social bargain of copyright limits the author's rights to
his or her "expression." The "ideas" in the work can be used
194. See Samuelson, supra, note 7, at 687-92.
195. It is common to see copyright and patent law described as a kind of
social contract or bargain. See, e.g., Fried, Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Mid-
vale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 (3d Cir. 1911) (patent described as a "contract
between an inventor and the government"); White, Why A Seventeen Year
Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 839, 839-40 (1956) (patent described as "an ex-
change of a bundle of temporary exclusive rights from the state for an inven-
tor's immediate disclosure and the later unlimited use of his invention.").
196. See supra notes 32, 115 (discussing the exclusive rights and duration of
copyright).
197. R. SALTMAN, COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER-READABLE WORKS: POLICY IM-
PACTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 52 (1977) (disclosure of ideas and expres-
sion is the quid pro quo for granting exclusive rights to copyright owners).
198. There is no requirement that copyright owners publish their works to
receive copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982) (duration of copy-
right protection not dependent on publication); 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982) (copy-
right protection is not conditioned on copyright registration); see also infra
notes 221-223 (discussing copyrights in unpublished works).
199. Underlying the copyright system is a basic assumption that authors
will "publish" their works when seeking to reap the commercial rewards for
them. Publication would, by its nature, disclose the contents of the work.
Neither publication nor disclosure of the work is required, however, because it
was assumed that reaping commercial rewards would not be possible without
publishing and disclosing. Machine-readable computer programs are the first
category of copyrightable work for which it is possible both to reap the com-




by anyone, even to write a book which will compete with the
original author's book.2°° In fact, one of the reasons copyright
grants such a long period of protection is that the author's
rights are limited by this idea/expression dichotomy.201 If copy-
right granted an author a set of exclusive rights in his or her
ideas, as well as in the book's expression, the period of protec-
tion would undoubtedly be shorter. An additional reason for
granting a long period of protection has been the nonutilitarian
character of the works copyright has protected.20 2 It is one
thing to grant a lengthy term of protection to songs, poems, and
paintings, and quite another to do so for airplane wings, pumps,
and clothes dryers.
Similarly, the social bargain inherent in patent law also in-
volves an exchange. Society grants the inventor203 a certain set
of exclusive rights, primarily a seventeen-year term of control
over the making and distribution of the invention, in return for
disclosure of the elements of the invention and the eventual
right of the public to practice freely the art the patent teaches.
Meaningful and extensive disclosure is required by statute in
order to get a patent.2°4 Disclosure is required in large part be-
cause, unlike published works protected by copyright, the
knowledge to be derived from a patented work often will not
be apparent from examination of the patented item. The
knowledge that can be derived from the patent application is
considered to be in the public domain as soon as the patent
200. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (no right to control
use of ideas or knowledge through copyright); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982)
(no copyright protection for ideas, methods, discoveries, processes, and the
like).
201. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B][2] (1985).
202. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 732-36.
203. Patent law does not give exclusive rights to everyone who improves
upon the prior art, but only to true inventors. See supra notes 84-85 and ac-
companying text.
204. The patent statute requires that the patent applicant provide
a written description of the invention and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). Applications for a patent are confidential pending issu-
ance of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982). Once the patent issues, the specifi-
cation is annexed to the patent and is no longer treated as confidential subject
matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
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issues.2 05
Patent law gives the inventor a monopoly on the invention
for seventeen years.206 The duration of the patent monopoly is
shorter than copyright, in part because patent rights extend to
practicing the "art" the patent discloses, 207 and in part because
it is socially desirable for the monopoly on utilitarian items to
be shorter than the monopoly on nonutilitarian items.208
Giving copyright protection to machine-readable computer
programs completely upsets the traditional intellectual prop-
erty bargain.2°9 Despite the fact that programs are a utilitarian
subject matter, they are protected for at least fifty years. This
runs counter to the congressional judgment, embodied in the
patent and chip laws, that utilitarian works should be subject to
shorter terms of protection than works that only convey infor-
mation or display appearances. Furthermore, when other types
205. E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). The
Court stated:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circu-
lated to the general public and those especially skilled in the trade,
such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such impor-
tance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to
pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which
disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual devel-
opment of further significant advances in the art.
Id. (emphasis added).
206. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
207. The patent owner has the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the in-
vention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
208. See, e.g., Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design A Suggested
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 726 (1983)
(suggesting that artistic works are more susceptible to appropriation than in-
dustrial designs and therefore in need of greater protection); Samuelson, supra
note 7, at 736; White, supra note 195, at 842-45. See supra notes 107-112 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the proportionality of patent, copyright,
and chip law durations.
209. As pointed out above, supra note 11, programs in machine-readable
form cannot be read as books can be read; in other words, they do not disclose
their contents, which means that the knowledge they contain is kept secret.
Moreover, as pointed out infra note 252 and accompanying text, some software
producers are trying to prevent reverse engineering of programs through coor-
dinate copyright/trade secret protection. Although it is true that a copyright
in a program will eventually expire, the commercial life of programs is, as
pointed out infra note 213, much shorter than the copyright duration, see 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1982). Furthermore, a frequent commercial practice in the
software publishing field is to bring out updated (and newly copyrighted) ver-
sions of commercially valuable programs. The updates will incorporate por-
tions of code from the prior versions, and it will be difficult, if not impossible,
for a user to be able to know what part of the code is, say, a year (or whatever)
closer to being in the public domain and what has just been added. Practically,
this will mean unlimited duration copyrights in programs.
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of copyrightable works are commercially exploited, the knowl-
edge they embody is disclosed to society in return for copyright
protection.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 demon-
strates that when inclusion of a new technology into patent or
copyright law would upset the intellectual property bargain, a
sui generis approach is necessary. The chip law strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the needs of society and the needs of
the industry. For example, in exchange for granting semicon-
ductor chips ten years of protection, 210 the law requires regis-
tration within two years of the first commercial use of the
design 21' and explicitly permits reverse engineering.2'2 As a
practical matter, computer programs in machine-readable form
do not belong in copyright any more than computer chips did.
Because of the utilitarian character of programs and because of
the generally short commercial life of software,213 a shorter
term than copyright provides would seem appropriate. 214 Con-
gress has been slower to warm to the idea of a sui generis form
of protection for machine-readable programs. The social bar-
gain of copyright, however, has been upset by the inclusion of
computer programs and it is now Congress's responsibility to
set things right.
C. MULTIPLE FORMS OF PROTECTION AS A SIGN OF
COPYRIGHT'S INADEQUACIES
If copyright were adequate to meet the needs of the
software industry, the software industry would not have to en-
gage in a frantic search for multiple layers of protection. Pres-
ently, however, there is widespread use of multiple and
seemingly inconsistent forms of legal protection, such as patent
coupled with copyright, trade secret coupled with copyright, or
210. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
213. See Note, International Copyright Law Applied To Computer Pro-
grams in the United States and France, 14 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 105, 126 (1982)
(marketable life of programs generally ten to fifteen years); cf Seneker &
Pearl, Software to Go, FORBES MAG., June 20, 1983, at 93-94 (commercial lfe of
program can be as short as months for games and as long as years for commer-
cial applications).
214. Even the World Intellectual Property Organization Model Provisions
for software would limit the period of protection to 20 years. See Abel, World-
Wide Protection of Computer Software: An Analysis of the WIPO Draft Pro-
posal, 2 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 278, 307-08, 315 (1981).
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a combination of all three.215 Furthermore, software producers
frequently use licensing agreements to create a more palatable
set of exclusive rights and limitations than copyright, on its
own, provides. 216 This widespread use of multiple forms of pro-
215. An example will help illustrate how these multiple forms might cur-
rently be used to protect software, and how radical the results would be as
compared with what the law previously allowed. Suppose someone discovers
how to make a new kind of fuel injection device for automobile engines. If the
idea is implemented in hardware form, it is clear that the design of the hard-
ware cannot be copyrighted because of the utilitarian character of the device.
It can not be patented unless it is nonobvious and otherwise meets patent stan-
dards. If it is patented, the inventor will have to disclose the details of the in-
vention, which will make it impossible to claim the device as a trade secret.
Even if the device is unpatented, it cannot long be protected as a trade secret
because once a car embodying the system is sold, it will be readily possible to
"reverse engineer" the device, see supra note 78 and accompanying text, and
there will no longer be a "secret" that can be protected.
If, however, the same fuel injection system is implemented in software,
the program that dictates how much fuel to inject into the engine at any given
time will, as some interpret the law now, be copyrightable. See Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983) (op-
erating system programs held copyrightable despite being part of the
machine), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defini-
tion of "computer program"). If the designer of this device seeks a patent on
it, or on the process the program carries out, it may not be necessary to dis-
close the contents of the program because the Patent Office has not been re-
quiring this kind of disclosure on computer program patent applications. Cf.
White Consol. Indus. v. Vega-Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 788-89, 792
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (patent office had issued a patent on a numerical control sys-
tem without requiring disclosure of the computer program implementing it;
patent was invalidated, however); Note, Patenting Inventions That Embody
Computer Programs Held As Trade Secrets, 59 WASH. L. REv. 601 (1984) (dis-
cussing White). The creator of this new computerized system might also try
to maintain it as a trade secret. The sale of the device installed in a car might
not dispel the secret, as it normally would with hardware, because it might in-
fringe the copyright to copy the program for study. See, e.g., Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 1983-84 Copyright L. Decisions
(CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983); see also inzfra note 252 and accompanying text.
If there is no lawful reverse engineering of the trade secret, the secret remains
intact. Thus the inventor who implements her fuel injection system in
software could theoretically have at least three layers of intellectual property
protection in the same thing, including two types of protection, copyright and
trade secret, that would be unavailable if the same device were implemented
in hardware.
216. For instance, many firms try to limit the right to use software to one
user and/or one machine. See, e.g., FIFTH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAw INSTITUTE
507 (1984) (MicroPro licensing agreement limits use to one machine). 'Without
an agreement, copyright owners cannot control uses of their works, for use is
not among the five exclusive rights of the copyright owner, see 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1982). Other firms attempt to limit or eliminate a right to make "back-up"
copies of the software. See FIFTH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAw INSTITUTE 507
(1984) (MicroPro license agreement provides that a user can only make a copy
of MicroPro products when authorized to do so in writing by MicroPro). Some
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tection is evidence that copyright provides inadequate protec-
tion for programs.
In the past, joint copyright and patent protection for the
same subject matter has been impossible.217 The two schemes
were mutually exclusive,2 18 because patent law traditionally re-
firms also attempt to prevent buyers or lessees from making adaptations of the
software, even for personal use. Id. at 514 (The Visicorp Customer License
Agreement states: "Neither the program nor its documentation may be modi-
fied or translated without ... written permission from VISICORP."). Some
firms even purport to restrict the user's rights to the "outputs" generated
through use of the program. The author has been informed by Computer Sci-
ence Department faculty at Carnegie-Mellon University that the owner of one
widely-used operating system claimed the right to block the sale of a commer-
cially valuable word processing program written by a CMU student and devel-
oped with the assistance of the owner's operating system when the student
sought to sell it to a competitor company. The owner probably regarded the
student's word processing program as a "derivative work" within the meaning
of the copyright statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), see also infra notes 235-245
and accompanying text.
The standard licensing agreements often included in packaged software
many times contain other provisions restricting the user's rights. The
MicroPro End User Program License Agreement Article 3 states:
The MicroPro logo, product names, software, manuals, documenta-
tion, and other support materials are either patented, copyrighted,
trademarked, or owned by MicroPro as trade secrets and/or proprie-
tary information. End User agrees not to remove any product identi-
fication or notices of such proprietary restrictions from MicroPro
Products. MicroPro retains exclusive ownership of the MicroPro
software, of MicroPro printed materials and of the MicroPro trade-
marks .... All techniques, algorithms, and processes contained in
MicroPro's products or any modification or extraction thereof consti-
tute trade secrets and/or proprietary information of MicroPro and
will be protected by End User.
FIFTH ANNUAL COMPUTER LAw INSTrrUTE 507 (1984). Many of them inform
the prospective purchaser that he will not really be the "owner" of a copy of
software but rather a "licensee," and that the license is not transferable. Id. at
511. The validity of many of these restrictions is highly questionable. See, e.g.,
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 1134
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (copyright owner may not unlawfully extend scope of copy-
right monopoly through license restrictions), rev'd on other grounds, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982); Rice, Trade Secret Clauses in Shrink-
Wrap Licenses, 2 COMPUTER LAw., Feb. 1985, at 17; Software Sales are Not
Sales, Publishers Say, Legal Times, April 15, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (describing con-
troversy over whether over-the-counter sales of software can be licenses).
217. Ornamental designs for articles of manufacture, if nonobvious and
original, may be eligible for design patent protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 171
(1982). If these designs meet the nonutilitarian standard of copyright, see
supra note 63 and accompanying text, then they may be protected instead
through the copyright laws. This is the only respect in which there has been
some subject matter overlap between copyright and patent law.
218. See Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th
Cir. 1943) (discussing the exclusivity of patent and copyright), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 785 (1944); Note, supra note 184, at 292 ("When copyrights intrude into
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quired that a thing have utility to be patentable and copyright
traditionally required that a thing not have utility to be copy-
rightable.2 19 Once copyright is extended to protect, the design
of a utilitarian thing, very serious and difficult questions arise
concerning the legal effect of a copyright and patent in the
same object.2 20
Similarly, joint trade secret and copyright protection has
been impossible because the basic assumptions of the two bod-
ies of law are incompatible. Federal copyright law has always
been focused on published works, 221 which by their very nature
were incapable of being held as "trade secrets." Although the
1976 revision of the Copyright Act was clearly intended to pre-
empt state common law copyright for unpublished works,2 2 2 it
the province of patents, however, the public purpose in patents is badly
compromised.").
219. Utility is required for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). As
indicated supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text, utilitarian works are ex-
cluded from the copyright realm unless they have nonutilitarian aspects which
can be identified separately from and can exist independently of the utilitarian
aspects, and then only the nonutilitarian part can receive copyright protection.
220. For example, when the patent expires, what if anything enters the
public domain? Might not the incentive to seek a patent, which requires dis-
closure of the valuable idea, be undermined if one can get a longer period of
protection without disclosure under copyright? See Note, supra note 184, at
292 (discussing the potential for deterioration of the patent system if copyright
moves into the protection of utilitarian works).
221. The primary focus of the Copyright Act of 1909 was on published
works. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (super-
seded 1976) (permitting authors to obtain federal copyright protection through
publication of the work with proper notice of the copyright claim). Section 2
of the 1909 Act, however, provided that nothing in that Act would prevent au-
thors of unpublished works from preventing copying, publication, or use of
those unpublished works at common law or in equity. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
Pub. L. No. 349, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (superseded 1976). State common law
copyright had previously been the primary mode of protection against the ap-
propriation of unpublished works without the consent of the author. See, e.g.,
Bobbs Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) ("At common law an au-
thor had a property in his manuscript and might have redress against anyone
who undertook to realize a profit from its publication without the authority of
the author."); Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 856, 857-59 (1978) (common law regulated exploitation of unpublished
works). State common law copyright was often called "the right of first publi-
cation." See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.01[B] (1985).
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright now attaches from a
work's creation. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). The primary focus of the law
remains on published works, however, as can be seen from a review of copy-
right cases since the 1976 Copyright Act took effect, virtually all of which in-
volve disputes over published works.
222. In 1976, the copyright law was revised, and federal copyright protec-
tion attached from the instant the work was fixed on paper or in some other
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does not appear that Congress intended to turn federal copy-
right law into a federal trade secret protection statute.M
Software producers, who have long relied primarily on
trade secret law, now insist they must have both copyright and
trade secret protection, and bristle at the suggestion that they
be required to elect only one form of protection.2 They feel
that disclosure of the contents of their commercially valuable
programs, which copyright law would require, would destroy
their business.225 In effect, they want to transform copyright
tangible medium. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 102(a), 302(a),
90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45, 2572 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 302(a) (1982)). By
this change, Congress simply intended to take state common law copyright
under the wing of federal copyright, not create federal trade secret protection.
See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 221, at 865. Plaintiffs in common law copyright
cases went to court to enforce their right to control when, where, and how to
go to market with their literary property. The essence of the wrong in a com-
mon law copyright case was not the same as the essence of the wrong in trade
secret cases, which involve either a breach of a confidential relationship or use
of some improper means, such as industrial espionage, to obtain a firm's com-
mercial secrets. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 757 (1939) (describing the
tort of trade secret misappropriation).
223. In 1976, when copyright protection was extended to include the period
before the work was published, there was no clear expression of congressional
intent to turn the federal copyright laws into a federal trade secret protection
statute. The legislative history of the preemption provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, indicates that the availability of relief under state trade secret law
would be unaffected by the new federal copyright law so long as the state
cause of action retained elements different in kind from copyright infringe-
ment (such as a breach of trust). See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5747-48.
Several authors have recently explored whether courts ought to find at
least partial preemption of state trade secret law by federal copyright law.
See, e.g., Luccarelli, The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law Over State
Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked With a Copy-
right Notice, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 19, 20-28 (1981); McGarrigle, Simultaneous
Copyright and Trade Secret Protection For Computer Programs, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1047-62 (1983).
224. See, e.g., CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 34 (dissent of Com-
missioner John Hersey) (indicating that the industry had fought hard not to
be forced to an election of copyright or trade secret).
225. According to software industry lawyers, the commercial advantage of
a software firm may be dependent on the secrecy of the algorithm that the
firm has developed to perform a particular task. If the firm is forced to dis-
close that algorithm, other firms would be able to develop competitive pro-
grams without having to expend the heavy research and development costs
incurred by this innovator. The algorithm for a program is probably an "idea"
or "procedure" so it would not be protected by copyright law, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1982). The innovator, therefore, could not control the commercial
exploitation of the competitive programs. This argument resembles the argu-
ment made by the semiconductor industry concerning "free rides." See supra
notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
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law into a federal trade secret statute,228 which would give pro-
tection without the quid pro quo of disclosure. Whether it is
wise or consistent with the constitutional purpose of copyright
to have copyright become a federal trade secret statute is
highly questionable. 227 As important as computer programs are
to our economic future, it is not clear that they are so impor-
tant as to require these kinds of distortions of traditional copy-
right principles, especially since these distortions are likely to
affect other subject matter besides programs. At a minimum,
the case for special relief from the burdens of disclosure should
be made openly to Congress; it should not be allowed to arise
by default because of prior misunderstandings about what was
at stake.
If Congress is concerned about preserving the traditional
boundaries of intellectual property law, and the balance in the
law which arises from those boundaries, a sui generis system of
protection for software will have to be devised. If it is, software
producers will no longer have to stack up layers of protection
in order for their interests to be adequately protected, and
courts will be spared the problems associated with sorting out
the rights created by overlapping forms of legal protection for
software.
D. THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT SET OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
Through "licensing agreements" and multiple layers of
legal protection, many software producers are currently trying
to obtain a different set of exclusive rights than copyright of-
fers. 228 By adopting sui generis protection for computer pro-
226. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 717-19 (discussing why there may be a
trend toward enforcement of trade secrets through copyright).
227. The concern is that the public welfare will not be served. See, e.g.,
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGIs-
TER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPY-
RIGHT LAws 5 (1961) ("As reflected in the Constitution, the ultimate purpose
of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning and culture for the
public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time
is a means to that end."); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (the immediate aim of copyright to compensate au-
thors for their creations "must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability" of those works); Note, supra note 184, at 281 (noting that
the Apple Computer case "seems to undermine the constitutional purpose of
copyright, which is to promote knowledge by granting the author an exclusive
right in his creation"); N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at D5, col. 3 ('The notion of
secret copyrights is abominable.") (quoting Professor Ralph Brown of Yale
University).
228. Some groups, such as the American Bar Association's Science and
1985]
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grams, Congress can specify a different set of exclusive rights
that are more appropriate for the subject matter and that strike
a more equitable balance between the rights of software produ-
cers, software users, and the public at large.
In devising a legal scheme applicable only to programs,
Congress would surely want to give software developers exclu-
sive rights to make and distribute copies of the protected pro-
gram. These are two of the exclusive rights of copyright
owners,22 but the same two exclusive rights are found in pat-
ent law230 and the new chip lawn 1 as well. As with semicon-
ductor chips, there does not seem to be a need to give program
owners the exclusive rights of public display or public perform-
ance of the programs. 232 Under current copyright law, how-
ever, program owners are granted these exclusive rights.2
3
Technology Section, have been trying to draft model software licensing agree-
ments. See ABA, SECTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMIrrEE ON CON-
TRACTING FOR COMPUTERS, MODEL SOFTWARE LICENSING AGREEMENT (draft
June 8, 1984). This same ABA Section has put together a collection of sample
licensing agreements for software. See ABA, SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
OGY, COMPUTER LAw DIVISION, SOFTWARE LICENSING PRACTICES COMmITTEE,
SOFTWARE CONTRACT FORMS (Jan. 1984). It is easy to imagine how difficult it
must be for users to keep track of which restrictions apply to which programs.
Many agreements contain provisions that terminate the license agreement
upon breach of any of the terms of the license. See, e.g., FIFTH ANNUAL COM-
PUTER LAW INSTITUTE 507 (1984) (MicroPro licensing agreement termination
provision). Termination of the agreement will render any use after that time
a copyright infringement as well as a breach of contract. The confusion that
may arise when a user tries to figure out which software licensing restrictions
apply to which software can lead even a well-meaning and reasonably diligent
user into trouble, often without there being any real injury to the economic
interest of the software copyright owner.
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (1982).
230. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
231. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984).
232. To protect the commercial interests of playwrights and sculptors, it
makes sense to give them rights to control public performances of their plays
and public displays of their sculptures. On the other hand, public performance
and display rights would not seem to be necessary for computer program own-
ers, because of the utilitarian character of programs and because the commer-
cial interests of software producers can be protected in other ways. For those
few programs, such as videogames, that might produce a kind of "perform-
ance" that should be protected, a copyright could still issue to protect the au-
diovisual display, because as noted infra note 255, videogames were originally
given copyright protection as audiovisual works.
233. Software is currently considered to be a "literary work" under the
copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "literary work"); see
also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Literary works are among the
categories of works in which the author retains the exclusive right to perform
or display the work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1982).
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This may result in a technical infringement, but an infringe-
ment in which it would be inappropriate to attach liability.2- 4
Whether there should be a derivative work right for
machine-readable programs is likely to be a hotly contested is-
sue. Copyright law gives copyright owners the exclusive right
to prepare "derivative works," in order to protect against such
things as unauthorized translations of an author's novels.235
Copyright defines "derivative work" very broadly.2 6 Such a
broad definition, however, may not be appropriate with respect
to computer software. Even whether to give the developer of a
program the right to control translations of the program from,
for example, Fortran to Pascal is problematic given that differ-
ent languages require different structures and that the program
"expression" is basically functional in nature. Even assuming
translations should be protected, the copyright derivative works
right is so broad that it may include a wide range of things that
were not intended to be, and should not be, controlled by the
program owner.2 37
Before discussing what those things are, it is worth empha-
234. For example, at many universities there is a computer facility with
many terminals, all in the same room, available for students to use. The term
"publicly," for the purposes of assessing performances and displays is defined
in the statute to mean "to perform or display it at a place open to the public or
at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
The computer facility or users at the facility, therefore, could be said to in-
fringe these exclusive rights every time they use a program in the common
room when other students are milling about or busy at their own work. The
same type of situation may arise in many businesses. This is not the kind of
situation Congress contemplated as an infringement.
235. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, there was no "derivative works"
right as such. Rather, the statute listed various specific examples of an au-
thor's exclusive rights. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, § 1, 35 Stat.
1075, 1075 (superseded 1976). Section 1, for example, provided in subsection
(b) that authors had the exclusive right to make or authorize translations of
their works, to dramatize the works if nondramatic, to transform them to
novel form if dramatic works, and so forth. See id. § 1(b), 35 Stat. at 1075. The
Copyright Act of 1976 simplifies things by giving copyright owners an exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982), and defin-
ing derivative works rather broadly, see id. § 101.
236. See supra note 123 for the full definition. The key words of the defi-
nition of "derivative work" under § 101 are: "work based upon one or more
preexisting works... ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
237. See supra note 216. See generally Brown, The Widening GCyre: Are
Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
L.J. 1 (1984). But see Goldstein, Derivative Works and Derivative Rights in
Copyright 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209, 247-52 (1983) (arguing for broad copy-
right derivative works right which includes treating useful articles as deriva-
tive works of copyrighted drawings of their design).
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sizing that neither patent law238 nor the new chip law239 pro-
vides an exclusive right to prepare derivative works. It does
not infringe a patent right for a consumer to buy a patented
item and make adaptations to it, or to sell the adapted item to a
third person. The same is true for semiconductor chips.
It may be appropriate to apply this same rule to machine-
readable programs because, like the subjects protected under
patent and semiconductor chip law, they are also utilitarian in
nature. At present, the copyright law gives owners240 of copies
of programs the right to adapt the programs if the adaptations
are essential steps in utilizing the programs or if the adaption is
for archival purposes only.2 1 One court has construed this pro-
vision to mean that users have a right to adapt a machine-read-
able program only if the program cannot be executed in
unadapted form.242 This adaptation right is much too narrow.
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). One of the early patent cases in which a
patentee sought a "derivative works" right under patent law was O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). In that case, the inventor of the telegraph
claimed patent rights to all devices, not just the one he developed, that em-
ployed electric current to communicate intelligible marks over long distances.
The Supreme Court ruled that this claim was illegal and void. Id at 120. The
rule in patent cases since then has been that the inventor only has rights to
that which he has actually invented and its equivalents.
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. 111984). As noted supra note 124 and ac-
companying text, the chip law specifically allows other chip manufacturers to
reverse engineer chip designs. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(1) (Supp. II 1984).
240. Copyright law does not appear to give this right to licensees. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1985). CONTU had originally recommended that
"rightful possessors" should have the rights set forth in § 117. See CONTU FI-
NAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. Congress, however, replaced this term with
owners" of "copies."
241. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1985). This section provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or au-
thorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued pos-
session of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of
this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with
the copy from which such copies were prepared only as part of the
lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations
so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the
copyright owner.
I&.
242. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. IM1. 1983)
(finding that enhancement kit for videogame constituted infringement of "lit-
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The whole point of buying rights to a program is to get the pro-
gram to do what it was purchased to do.1 3
The derivative works right is most questionable when ap-
plied to works generated through use of the program.244 Pro-
grams that provide substantial creative input into the
development of new works, such as music, pictures, or chemical
formulas are already available in the marketplace.245 More will
be available in the future. Software producers, under the deriv-
ative works provision of the copyright law, could conceivably
claim ownership rights in everything generated through use of
their programs. Because no other kind of copyrighted work is
utilitarian and capable on its own of generating other works,
the issue raised by this application of the derivative works right
has not been addressed before. The reasons that support giving
novelists protection from unauthorized translations, however,
do not support giving software producers ownership rights in
everything generated through use of their programs.
There may, however, be good reasons to give program own-
ers an exclusive right to control use of their work, just as pat-
ent law gives the patentee the exclusive right to use the
erary works" copyright in the program stored in ROM chips). It is possible to
read § 117 more broadly than did the court in Midway, see id. at 745 n.2, to
permit adaptations essential to use of the program for the user's purposes. See
also Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the Software Users'
Rights or an Illusory Promise, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 459, 467-83 (1985) (dis.
cussing judicial interpretation of § 117).
243. One consequence of Congress's decision not to let rightful possessors
of programs make even "essential step" modifications is that virtually all
software available in the market place is "licensed," not "sold." (The validity
of many of these "licenses" is questionable. See supra note 216.) This practice
means that the industry has stymied any legal recognition of user modification
rights. That, of course, will not necessarily stop users from modifying the
software to suit their purposes anyway (as, for example, to correct a "bug" in
the program), but it does put them in a precarious position if and when a legal
dispute arises.
244. See supra note 123 (full copyright definition of "derivative work").
Arguably, because of the breadth of the definition, a computer-generated work
is "based upon" or "derived from" the program that generated it. It would
thus be a "derivative work" within the meaning of the statute.
245. When CONTU was studying new technology issues, it recognized that
computer programs were involved in creating new works of this sort. See
CODTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 43-44. CONTU, however, glossed over
the authorship problems computer-generated works could create by assuming
that the user would always be the author and that computers could not make
any meaningful contribution to authorship. Id. at 44-46. CONTU said nothing
about the critical question of whether machine-generated works would or
would not be derivative works within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2)
(1982).
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patented invention. Given the utilitarian character of machine-
readable programs, the fact that what has been implemented in
software could instead have been implemented in patentable
hardware,246 and the fact that the software industry already
collects much of its income based on use, an alignment of
software law with patent law in this respect would make sense.
It might also reduce the software industry's penchant for using
multiple forms of protection and "licensing agreements" to get
what copyright law will not provide.247
E. THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT SET OF LIMITATIONS ON
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
The utilitarian character of programs makes it appropriate
to impose limitations that are more akin to those of patent law
than copyright on the exclusive rights of program owners. Two
patent-like limitations on exclusive rights have already been
discussed: allowing the protected work to be used as a tool to
create other works, and allowing the work to be modified if
necessary to fulfill its intended purpose. A broader first sale
rule,248 similar to the one available in the chip law249 and pat-
ent law,25° might also be appropriate for machine-readable com-
puter programs.
Program users should also have the right to reverse engi-
neer a program and to make a copy of the program for reverse
engineering purposes. This feature of the chip law2 1 should be
246. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text; see also Lawlor, A
Proposal for Strong Protection of Computer Programs Under the Copyright
Law, 20 JURIMETRIcs J. 18, 25-28 (1979) (strongly urging that software copy-
right owners should have right to control use of their programs).
248. The copyright "first sale" rule limits the copyright owner's right to en-
forcement of two of the five exclusive rights he may have, namely the right to
control distribution and public displays of certain works. Those exclusive
rights are exhausted after a "first sale" of the work to the public. That is, the
copyright owner is entitled to a share on the first sale to the public, but not
thereafter. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 106(3),(5) (1982). Additionally, the "first sale"
right is given only to "owners" of copies of copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(c) (1982). As mentioned supra note 243, it is virtually impossible to
"buy" a piece of software outright, for the software industry claims only to "li-
cense" use, so possessors of software have virtually no "first sale" rights
whatsoever.
249. The chip law's "first sale" rule is broader. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(b)
(Supp. II 1984). It grants the owner of the mask work a continuing exclusive
right to control reproductions of the work following the "first sale." Id.
250. The patent rule is similar to the chip law's rule. See 4 D. CHISUM,
CHIUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2] (1985).
251. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
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incorporated in a sui generis scheme for programs. At present,
software firms are attempting to use a hybrid of copyright and
trade secret law to make reverse engineering unlawful.252 This
is at odds with traditional intellectual property principles, but,
unless the law is amended, software producers can be expected
to press their claims in this direction.
F. A DIFFERENT TEST FOR INFRINGEMENT
Another reason for preferring a sui generis approach to
copyright is that the test traditionally used to determine
whether there has been a copyright infringement cannot be
meaningfully applied to programs. Although copyright is cer-
tainly adequate to protect against exact duplicates of the pro-
tected work, many infringement disputes do not involve
identical copies but rather "new" works that are substantially
similar to the copyrighted work. Although expert testimony on
the general similarity of the works is admissible in evidence,253
the traditional test of copyright infringement has always been
whether "a lay observer" comparing the copyrighted and the al-
legedly infringing work would regard the two as being so sub-
stantially similar as to conclude that the latter had unlawfully
appropriated the expression of the former.254 The "lay ob-
server" test, however, requires subject matter that is amenable
to visual or audible presentation, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device, so that a comparison of the two works
can be made. Some machine-readable computer programs
cause an audio or visual display.255 This has prevented most
252. See, e.g., Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc.,
1983-84 COPYRIGHT L. DECISIONS (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983) (acknowledg-
ing right to reverse engineer under trade secret law, but finding copyright in-
fringement based on core dump of program in order to study its contents);
Grogan, suprm note 11, at 8-10 (study of protection afforded by distributing
software only in object code form).
253. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E][3] (1985).
254. I& § 13.03[E], at 13-46 to 13-47 n.92. One often-quoted formulation of
similarity is Judge Learned Hand's statement from Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960): "[Whether] the ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to over-
look them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."
255. Videogames are an example of computer programs that create vivid
audiovisual displays. The audiovisual aspects of these games are separately
copyrightable as audiovisual works. Most of the published cases involving
videogame copyrights have involved only audiovisual copyrights. See, e.g.,
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). A few have involved both au-
diovisual and program copyrights, see, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l,
1985]
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people from realizing that these programs themselves cannot
intelligibly be seen or heard, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.256
The fact that these programs cause displays confuses the is-
sue. Entirely different programs may produce the same dis-
play, while an identical program which has been supplemented
may produce a very different display.25 7 Using the copyright
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982), and have relied heavily on the audiovisual
cases. It is certainly much easier to apply the traditional test of copyright in-
fringement to videogame cases. See Comment, Substantial Similarity Between
Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV.
1277, 1290-95 (1983). But how does one make a comparison between two
microchips for toasters, or gas pumps, or heart pacemakers?
256. It is important to realize that when computer scientists talk about
"reading" machine-readable programs, they mean something different than
the ordinary person would suppose. See, e.g., C. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY
259 (1966) (five definitions of "read" in technical sense). When one realizes
that "load" or "retrieve" are synonyms for "read" in the computer science
sense, one can grasp the significance of the difference in intelligibility. One
may "load" a mousetrap or "retrieve" a book from the library, but these are
very different things from "reading" a mousetrap or "reading" a book in the
ordinary meaning of the term. As Commissioner Hersey stated: "[I]f a skilled
programmer can 'read' a program in its mature, machine-readable form, it is
only in the sense that a skilled home-appliance technician can 'read' the
equally mechanical printed circuits of a television receiver." CONTU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30 (dissent of Commissioner John Hersey); see also
D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 290
(1980) (likening the readability of machine code to organization of DNA
molecules).
257. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982)
(videogame case recognizing that two different programs may produce the
same audiovisual display); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 747
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (no infringement of audiovisual copyright in videogame,
although program copyright infringed); see also Note, Copyright Infringement
of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88 (1984). Articles such as Russo & Derwin, Copy-
right in the "Look and Feel" of Software, 2 COMPUTER LAw., Feb. 1985, at 1,
that advocate granting copyright protection for the "look and feel" of software
because that is where the commercial value may lie, are particularly distres-
sing. Where traditional copyright law differs in approach from the misappro-
priation theory on which these authors rely is in its historical willingness to
allow copying of commercially valuable ideas so long as particular expressions
of the ideas were not stolen. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
The decisions in which software infringement has been found partly based on
structural similarities in software are also questionable. See, e.g., Whelan As-
socs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (finding infringement of dental laboratory software copyright partly be-
cause of structural similarities). The logical structure of a person's program,
however, seems to be awfully close to the kind of "idea, procedure, process sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery" which the copy-




"lay observer" test as to the programs in these two situations, a
lay observer would probably find an infringement in the first
case where there was none, and not find an infringement in the
second case where there was one. Furthermore, many pro-
grams do not produce any display at all, but only do such things
as control the operations of pacemakers, traffic systems, and
catalytic converters. In these contexts, the "lay observer" test
is useless. Indeed, it would lead to economically undesirable re-
sults since a program that functions in a way substantially simi-
lar to the copyrighted program would be an infringement.
Neither the software industry nor society as a whole would be
benefited by such a standard for program infringements.
G. RECOGNIZING THAT A CHANGE IN How PROGRAMS ARE
"WRITTEN" MAY AFFECT THE LAW
The current copyright system is premised on a creative
model of an individual programmer sitting at a computer termi-
nal writing words on paper or typing source code into a com-
puter. That model is, for the present, fairly accurate. This
method of computer programming, however, is in the process of
changing, and is expected to change radically in the foreseeable
future. Programs are now being developed that can create
other programs by taking modules of code from their own data
base and composing them into the desired program.2 58 A user
need only specify, in a general way, what the requirements are,
how the data should flow, and what the results should be, and a
program will automatically be produced. In the near future,
software "reuse" of this sort and other kinds are expected to be
the primary way in which programs will be created.2 9 It is not
clear whether copyright can yet answer the question of who
will own rights in a program generated through such a process,
258. See, e.g., Horowitz & Minson, An Expansive View of Re-usable
Software, SE-10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 477 (1984).
259. See generally, Special Issue on Software Reusability, SE-10 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 473-609 (1984). One author in this
issue stated: "A tentative conclusion is that of all the code written in 1983,
probably less than 15% is unique, novel, and specific to individual applications.
The remaining 85% appears to be common, generic, and concerned with put-
ting applications onto computers." Jones, Reusability in Programming: A Sur-
vey of the State of the Art SE-10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING 488, 488 (1984). Since much of computer programming is ge-
neric, giving exclusive rights to the first person to design the most efficient ge-
neric design of an input/output routine, for example, may not be socially




especially if modules of code are taken from different parent
programs and assembled into a new program.26°
To further complicate matters, robots are currently being
"programmed" by being physically taken through a series of
steps that the robot can then repeat by executing the program
thus created.261 A human instructed to do the same set of steps
could not in any way be subject to copyright.262 Moreover,
some believe that it is only a matter of time before people will
be able to "write" programs by orally specifying what they
want a program to do.263 As the method of program creation
moves substantially away from the model copyright has as-
sumed, a reassessment of how the law should deal with alloca-
tion of rights will be necessary.264
260. On the one hand, one might argue that a program composed of mod-
ules of another program might be a "derivative work" within the meaning of
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1982), and therefore it might infringe the parent pro-
gram's copyright. On the other hand, since it is the very purpose of the parent
program to produce programs-perhaps even an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the program in conjunction with the machine-this might make the
production of another program a fair use, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), or privi-
leged, see 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1985).
261. See, e.g., McGhee, Future Prospects for Sensor-Based Robots, COM-
PUTER VISION AND SENSOR-BASED ROBOTS 323, 323, 325-26 (1979); Summers &
Grossman, XPROBE: An Experimental System for Programming Robots By
Example, 3 INT'L J. OF ROBOTICS RESEARCH 25 (1984).
262. A human instructed to do the same thing would be practicing the
"art" the copyrighted book detailing the steps in the process "taught." Under
the venerable case of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1982) this would not be protected by the copyright. For a discussion of the
"practical use" doctrine, see Oxman, supra note 7, at 444-46.
263. See, e.g., E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MCCORDUCK, THE FIFTH GENERATION
87-93, 118-19 (1983); Levinson & Liberman, Speech Recognition by Computer,
Sci. AM., April 1981, at 64-76.
264. It is necessary to have a legal system that facilitates rather than im-
pedes the development of and dissemination of software without endless litiga-
tion over unclear issues. If the law gives all rights in things produced through
use of a program to the original programmer, users will feel cheated and will
feel justified in "ripping off" the producer. If one gives joint ownership rights
to users and programmers, one will have to confront complex questions which
the usual joint ownership situation does not pose. The usual situation assumes
more cooperation and coincidence of interests than may be present in the
software context where such "joint authors" would not have been jointly in-
volved in the initial production of the software. There are also interesting
questions about the patentability of computer-generated inventions. See, e.g.,
Blick, Computer-Assisted Chemical Synthesis Packages: Is This a New Prob-
lem in Patentability?, 1 J. OF INFORMATION Sci. 227, 229 (1979) (suggesting
that availability of computer-assisted organic synthesis packages must have an




It would clearly be -preferable for the sake of simplicity to
have only two primary forms of intellectual property law-
copyright and patent-and to accommodate new subject mat-
ters within them. Continuing scientific and technological devel-
opments have created categories of subject matter that were
wholly unforeseen by the original drafters of the patent and
copyright laws. These laws have, over the years, been ex-
panded to incorporate much of the new subject matter. Semi-
conductor chips, however, created somewhat unique problems.
There was clearly a need to protect semiconductor chip designs,
but to use either patent or copyright to accomplish that goal
would have required abandoning the fundamental principles
underlying each. Congress wisely recognized this problem, and
ultimately decided to adopt a sui generis approach to chip de-
sign protection.
What was most admirable about how Congress handled the
semiconductor chip design protection problem was that it paid
close attention to the particular qualities of the subject matter
under consideration and to the specific kind of protection the
industry needed in order to prosper, while also considering
competing interests such as the concerns of innocent infringers
and reverse engineers. 26 5 It is true, as the Senate Report ini-
tially stated, that semiconductor chip masks and the chips
themselves are like maps and technical scientific drawings,
26
but as the House Report pointed out, they are not just like
maps and technical drawings.26 7 Congress ultimately decided
chips were not enough like these clearly copyrightable works
because of the chip's functionality and because of the different
kind of creativity that produced the chip design.268 Represen-
tative Robert Kastenmeier, in his statement in favor of the sui
generis bill, stated:
The appropriate solution to the problem of protection for semiconduc-
tor chips is the creation of a sui generis proprietary right, separate
and distinct from the author's copyright.
Stated somewhat differently, a mask work is not a book. The
proposed legislation does not engage in the legal fiction of treating
265. See supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
268. The enactment of the sui generis approach rather than the copyright
approach to protection of semiconductor chip designs is strong evidence that




books and mask works similarly. In the long run, we will reap great
benefits by not proceeding from false analogies.269
Machine-readable computer programs are also not
books.2 7 0 They resemble books in the same superficial way that
chips resemble drawings of semiconductor designs. It is a legal
fiction to say that machine-readable programs are, in the copy-
right sense, enough like books that the same legal rules should
be applied to them.
Machine-readable computer programs are utilitarian
works. They do more than simply convey information or dis-
play appearances. They control the operations of millions of
machines; they make computers capable of being millions of
different machines. The rules of law that are needed to deal
with this kindof subject matter should be shaped to the partic-
ular nature of the subject matter itself as well as to the needs
of the software industry and users. Just as Congress would not
regulate the broadcasting industry exactly the same way as it
would regulate the hydroelectric power industry, Congress
should not make the mistake of treating unlike things alike in
the intellectual property field.
In recommending that machine-readable computer pro-
grams be protected under copyright law, CONTU was not con-
cerned with finding the most appropriate way to protect
software, given its unique characteristics, but instead focused
on whether machine-readable programs could be fit within the
copyright scheme in any fashion.27 ' It is apparent that the non-
utility principle underlying copyright must be abandoned if
programs are going to be included. The legislative history of
the chip law, however, provides clear evidence that Congress
wishes to retain the nonutility principle of copyright.272 Con-
gress should now reconsider its earlier and misguided decision
to include machine-readable computer programs in the copy-
right realm, and adopt a sui generis approach to the protection
of machine-readable programs. Although the software industry
initially may be hesitant to acknowledge it, it too would be
269. 130 CONG. REC. H5492 (daily ed. June 11, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
270. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
271. See CONTU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 16-19. Dissenting
CONTU Commissioner Hersey apparently drafted a Computer Software Pro-
tection Act as an alternative to the copyright approach preferred by the
CONTU Majority, see Davidson, supra note 184, at 766-67, but there was no
mention of the possibility of a sui generis solution in the Final Report of
CONTU.
272. See supra notes 59-72, 92-93 and accompanying text.
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better off with something more certain, and more carefully
crafted to address its needs, than the uncertain hodgepodge of
protection currently available.

